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I. Introduction
In the more than forty years since the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Everson v. Board of Education,' lawyers, scholars, lay-
men, and judges have struggled to find a consistent, logical
method for interpreting and applying the terse language of the
religion clauses of the first amendment.2 Most of the attention
(and controversy) has focused on the first of these, known as the
establishment clause. After closely examining the cases, opin-
ions, and articles in this area, only one proposition may be confi-
* This title stems from a comment made by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in her
concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985), in reference to her
status then as the Court's junior member.
t Associated with the firm of Shearman & Sterling in New York. B.A., 1981, Boston
University; J.D., 1985, Boston University. The views contained herein, for better and
worse, are solely those of the author. I wish to thank Lawrence Sager, Neil Devins, and
Robert Feder for their helpful suggestions and comments along the way. Josephine Fra-
gale provided all secretarial assistance. I wish to express special thanks to Archibald Cox,
for his time and invaluable comments on an earlier version of this article. Finally, I must
note my deep gratitude to Ira C. Lupu for both his strong support and his insightful
critical analyses.
Copyright 0 1988 Benjamin D. Feder All Rights Reserved
1. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). This was the Court's first impression of the limitations placed
on government behavior by the establishment clause; earlier cases brought under this
clause were disposed of on other grounds. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899);
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). The Court had previously analyzed the scope of
the free exercise clause. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
1
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dently stated: any approach to the establishment clause which
does not either explicitly or implicitly consider and reference its
results to an underlying principle of individual religious liberty
must fail, for it can never do more than beg the question as to
the basic purpose of the religion clauses within our constitu-
tional structure.
There exists no talismanic catchword, test, or methodology
that will consistently lead the way. The Supreme Court, and
those of us who must comport with its interpretations, should
recognize that "religious liberty" presupposes at least four dif-
ferent types of threatening interactions between the institutions
of government and matters of religious belief. Both history and
logic instruct us that religious liberty seeks equally to protect
the state from certain types of religious influence, as it does to
protect religious beliefs from state interference. Religious liberty
also suggests an equal standing and worth among all sects in the
eyes of the state, and prohibits government interaction with reli-
gion that can lead to the use of state institutions and resources
to foster sectarian factionalism. Finally, concern for individual
religious liberty requires that the state take cognizance of in-
stances where laws of general application may unintentionally,
but nonetheless substantially, burden an individual's free choice
in matters of religious belief. These different values are not nec-
essarily consistent with one another; indeed, their application in
particular cases may sometimes conflict. Proper interpretation of
the religion clauses requires a careful balancing among these dif-
ferent elements in a way that will best further the underlying
principle of individual religious liberty. The purpose of this Arti-
cle is to suggest such a methodology.
This Article will first examine the line of establishment
clause cases that begins with Everson and ends with the 1971
case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.' The Court, in these cases, failed to
articulate a normative principle of individual religious liberty,
against which such judicial doctrines as "separation of church
and state," "neutrality," or the tripartite test of Lemon4 could
3. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4. Id. at 612-13 ("The [government behavior] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion; finally, [it] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with reli-
[Vol. 8:249
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be applied. The Court has variously relied on these doctrines
without the benefit of an understood reference point, resulting
in an accumulation of inconsistent case law.5 There will then fol-
low an attempt to set forth a definition of individual religious
liberty, along with a demonstration as to how the Court must
protect it. Finally, this Article will seek to square the views
herein set forth with those articulated in the past four terms by
Justice O'Connor6 and argue that her approach may provide the
Court with the basis for developing an analytically sound set of
guidelines for application in future cases.
II. 1947-1971 - A Brief Overview
A. The Early Cases: 1947-1952, Confusing the End with the
Means
The cause of much of the recent confusion in this area has
its roots in the cases decided before Lemon.7 The Court, by fail-
ing to make explicit the underlying purposes of the religion
clauses, and in failing to explain adequately the proper relation-
ship between the establishment and the free exercise clauses,
created a firm set of guidelines while simultaneously undercut-
ting their usefulness for future application.
gion.' ") (citations omitted).
5. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York's
tuition reimbursement program for parents of religious school children offends the estab-
lishment clause through its primary effect of advancing religion) with MueUer v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983) (Minnesota statute authorizing tax deductions for expense of send-
ing child to parochial school has sufficiently secular purpose so as not to violate the
establishment clause). Compare Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Kentucky statute
requiring Ten Commandments be posted in every public school classroom violates the
establishment clause) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (no violation of the
establishment clause found where city annually erected Christmas display on privately
owned park).
6. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jafree, 105 S.
Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 2914, 2918 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
105 S. Ct. 3216, 3231 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3243 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Bowen v. Roy,
106 S. Ct. 2147, 2164 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2873 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
7. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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In the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education,8 the
Court unanimously adopted the concept of "a wall of separation
between Church and State"9 as the proper starting point for ad-
dressing questions arising under the establishment clause. The
Court was unable to make clear, however, that "separation" was
a broad term that could signify different values, depending on
the type of church-state interaction that was feared. The "wall"
metaphor derives from the writings of Thomas Jefferson and
was used by the Court as far back as the 1870's.1° It was Jeffer-
son's 11 particular brand of separationist doctrine that ran most
heavily through the opinions in Everson and Illinois ex rel. Mc-
Collum v. Board of Education.2 In Everson, a five to four ma-
jority upheld the expenditure of public money for transportation
of parochial school children. In McCollum, a near-unanimous
Court struck down a "shared-time" program, which allowed reli-
gious instruction in public schools during the school day. The
absolutist language used by the majority (and the result urged
by the minority) in Everson aligned itself closely with the Jeffer-
sonian view that, consistent with the 18th century enlighten-
ment distrust of organized religion, separation was absolutely
necessary to keep the church from gaining sway over the public
coffers and public policy.'"
8. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
10. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jeffer-
son's letter to the Danbury Baptist Ass'n).
11. Three basic approaches that utilize the principle, "separation of Church and
State," have been related to the views of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Roger
Williams. When this Article classifies a case as employing "Jefferson's separation," it is
only done to clarify the analysis and not to imply that the Court was consciously adher-
ing to any particular set of guidelines.
12. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). See Paulsen, Religion, Equality and the Constitution: An
Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 311, 322-26 (1986).
13. See T. JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J.P. Boyd ed. 1950). See also Katz, Radiations from Church
Tax Exemption, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 93, 96:
Howe described the Jefferson principle of separation as rooted in deistic rational-
ism and anticlericalism. Church and State should be separated "as the safeguard
of public and private interests against ecclesiastical depredations and excursions."
Following this view, the Court seemed to have assumed that "the First Amend-
ment intended to keep alive the bias of the Enlightenment which asserted that
government must not give its aid in any form to religion lest impious clerks
[Vol. 8:249
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The majority opinion in McCollum, written by Justice
Black, struck down the Illinois program on the sole basis that it
was not "separation." 14 The separate opinions of Justices Frank-
furter and Jackson, however, recognized the need to consider
competing values' and expressed concern that painting with
broad strokes in this area could well lead to results contrary to
those intended by the Court."6 In an opinion that varied greatly
in both tone and substance from that of the majority, Justice
Frankfurter relied on the James Madison view that separation
was a tool for maintaining equality among different sects and
avoiding politico-religious factionalism,17 rather than on Jeffer-
sonian distrust.
In Zorach v. Clauson,'8 the Court upheld a "time release"
program, in which students were permitted to leave school early
in order to receive religious instruction. While it may be end-
lessly debated whether the case was factually distinguishable
from McCollum, the tone and language of Justice Douglas' ma-
jority opinion suggest that the Zorach Court was merely at-
tempting to allow the separation principle to expand to the lim-
its of its own logic. Having already identified as goals under the
establishment clause the need to keep government free from at-
tempted domination by powerful religious groups and (in Frank-
furter's opinion in McCollum) the need to prevent strife and
competition between various religious groups (or religious and
tighten their grip upon the purses and the minds of men."
Id. (quoting HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965)).
14. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948).
15. Id. at 212-13 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 235-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 217 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The preservation of the community from divisive conflicts, of Government from
irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, of religion from censorship and coer-
cion however subtly exercised, requires strict confinement of the State to instruc-
tion other than religious, leaving to the individual's church and home, indoctrina-
tion in the faith of his choice.
Id. (emphasis added). Accord Curry, James Madison and the Burger Court: Converging
Views of Church-State Separation, 56 IND. L.J. 615, 619 (1981). "The Memorial's argu-
ment against assessment emphasized the tendency of religious establishment to promote
faction and to leave government impotent to combat it. Madison argued not that religion
was unimportant, but that religious establishment is fundamentally divisive." Id. (em-
phasis added).
18. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
1988]
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nonreligious groups), it necessarily followed that the establish-
ment clause also fulfilled the need to keep religious groups free
from attempted domination by a hostile government. This third
strand of separationist doctrine is usually attributed to the writ-
ings of Roger Williams.19
Three strands of separationist doctrine were thus clearly
identified: Jefferson's desire to keep government free from reli-
gious influence, Williams' view that the church must be kept se-
cure from government intrusion, and Madison's fears that reli-
gious and secular coinvolvement would inevitably lead to
sectarian factionalism and inequality. This is by no means to
suggest that these three strands are logically consistent or that
the cases in which each may be applicable should be mutually
exclusive. The opposite is closer to the truth; Jefferson, Wil-
liams, and Madison were each addressing the idea of separation
of church and state from different perspectives, and one may de-
rive from each a different notion of exactly where "the wall"
ought to be erected and how high it needs to be built.
The Court, however, in these early cases failed to address
effectively these differences, or even to identify them. More cru-
cially, the Court was treating the doctrine of "a wall of separa-
tion between Church and State"20 as the proper end to be
sought by the establishment clause, rather than as a means, or
governing principle, for reaching some deeper purpose. Looking
back at the Court's failure, at this early juncture, to distinguish
explicitly between the underlying principle sought and the gov-
erning principle used, one may clearly discern the root causes of
much of the later confusion.
Professor Katz recognized this problem inherent in the
Court's approach, and suggested an answer:
[T]he limits of the separation doctrine are to be found by refer-
ence to the constitutional principle of religious liberty, not vice
versa.
The recognition of this proposition would place the recent
controversy in a new light. Much of the opposition to the "no aid"
principle has arisen because the principle was expressed in terms
of strict "separation." If it is understood that the separation prin-
19. See Katz, supra note 13, at 96-97.
20. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
[Vol. 8:249
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ciple does not preclude action to avoid restraints on religious free-
dom, one source of confusion would be eliminated ....
The concept of "religious liberty," for all its definitional
problems, fits better as an underlying purpose of the establish-
ment clause than the notion of erecting "a wall of separation
between Church and State." Governing principles are necessary
to provide guidance and some measure of predictability. But
they cannot provide such guidance without reference to some
recognized further end, especially in such a sensitive area of con-
stitutional law.
B. 1960-1971 - The Evolution of the Three-Pronged Test of
Lemon v. Kurtzman
Throughout the 1960's, the Court refined and expanded its
reliance on governing principles. But none of these doctrines was
properly related to a fully explicated underlying value. Justice
Frankfurter's long concurrence in McGowan v. Maryland22
presented an example of how a proper approach could have been
developed. The Court in this case upheld the constitutionality of
Sunday Closing laws on the basis of the state's contention that
the laws in their current form served valid secular purposes.2
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the Court's reliance on the separation principle, at
least as it had been articulated in Everson and McCollum. He
specifically alluded to the due process concept of "liberty"2 ' and
specifically sought to show how "separation" was of primary im-
portance as a means of guaranteeing this liberty, but not as an
end in itself. 5 For Justice Frankfurter, it was necessary that
21. Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CH. L. REV. 426, 428-29
(1953) (emphasis added).
22. 366 U.S. 420, 459-559 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
23. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445-46 (1961).
24. Id. at 460-61 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The opinion also made some effort to
relate both religion clauses to this concept. Id. at 463.
25. Id. at 461.
By its nature, religion - in the comprehensive sense in which the Constitution
uses that word - is an aspect of human thought and action which profoundly
relates the life of man to the world in which he lives. Religious beliefs pervade,
and religious institutions have traditionally regulated, virtually all human activity.
It is a postulate of American life, reflected specifically in the First Amendment to
the Constitution but not there alone, that those beliefs and institutions shall con-
1988]
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"separation of church and state" remain a "not rigidly precise
but revealing phrase,"2 6 to be given content by reference to an
underlying principle of religious liberty and not by strict
definitions. 7
In Torcaso v. Watkins,28 the Court struck down a Maryland
law requiring a declaration of belief in the existence of God as
requisite for holding any public office.29 Justice Black's majority
opinion broadly reaffirmed the separation principle as enunci-
ated in Everson,0 yet failed to identify the specific evil sought
to be prevented, except in the general assertion that "[t]he
power and authority of the State of Maryland thus is put on the
side of one particular sort of believers .
Engel v. Vitale, 2 the Regents' Prayer Case, followed in a
similar vein. While the result reached by the Court may proba-
bly have been explained by reference to either the Jefferson,
Williams, or Madison views toward separation, the language em-
ployed by the Court was broad enough to encompass all three,
tinue, as the needs and longings of the people shall inspire them, to exist, to func-
tion, to grow, to wither, and to exert with whatever innate strength they may con-
tain their many influences upon men's conduct, free of the dictates and directions
of the state.
Id.
26. Id. at 460.
27. This placed Justice Frankfurter at the opposite pole from Professor Kurland,
who argued for an approach which placed the higher emphasis on precision and predict-
ability, rather than on furtherance of an underlying value. See Kurland, Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1961) (urging a governing principle
based on a concept of strict neutrality):
[Tihe proper construction of the religion clauses of the first amendment is that
the freedom and separation clauses should be read as a single precept that govern-
ment cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction, because these
clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to
impose a burden.
Id. at 6.
Whatever the philosophical failings of Kurland's approach, one cannot deny the
practical difficulties inherent in the Frankfurter methodology. As Professor Kurland
noted, "One may admire the extensive research and history revealed in [Justice Frank-
furter's] concurring opinion and yet wonder whether its very breadth of coverage will
add clarity or confusion for those lawyers and judges called upon to put these materials
to further use in the future procession of constitutional litigation." Id. at 90-91.
28. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
29. Id. at 495-96.
30. Id. at 492-95.
31. Id. at 490.
32. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/2
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while the identified evil was again stated abstractly.3 Perhaps
the Court was concerned that one or more organized religions
would gain sway over certain functions of government. Perhaps
it feared that the state had impermissibly intruded into the
realm of religion by composing and urging the recitation of a
prayer. The Court may have been worried that the institutions
of the state would devolve into battlefields on which sectarian
differences might be fought.3 4 A more crucial omission, however,
lay in the Court's failure to explain how "separation" worked to
protect those who had challenged the Regents' Prayer in the
first place.35
The following year, in School District of Abington v.
Schempp,6 the Court set down a new governing principle of
"wholesome neutrality; ' s3 the Court would require that both
"the purpose and primary effect"38 of challenged statutes and
practices be shown to be secular. But the Court's opinion did
not manage to resolve the problems that were building from the
inconsistencies and sweeping characterizations of the earlier
cases, and the difficulties in relying on the doctrine of "separa-
33. Id. at 430-31:
The Establishment Clause ... is violated by the enactment of laws which establish
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving in-
dividuals or not .... When the power, prestige and financial support of govern-
ment is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion
is plain. But the purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go much further
than that. Its first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union
of government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion.
Id.
34. Cf. Clark, Religion and the Law, 15 S.C.L. REV. 855 (1963).
35. See Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV.
1031 (1963). Though in full agreement with the result reached, Professor Kauper was
somewhat less than enthusiastic about the Court's approach:
It is ... the Court's broad and absolutist interpretation of the first amendment,
its disregard of the sanctions furnished by history for religious practices in the
public schools, its indifference to the problem of standing, its failure to relate the
establishment limitation to meaningful considerations of personal liberty.., and
its failure to come to grips with the delicate problem of the rights of non-conform-
ists in a community that recognizes a common religious heritage that present the
constitutional problems and difficulties.
Id. at 1065-66 (emphasis added).
36. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
37. Id. at 225.
38. Id. at 222.
9
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tion of church and state" clearly appear. The Court spoke of
"neutrality" as a means for protecting "religious liberty," but it
made no attempt to provide that term with any substance, quot-
ing instead passages from previous opinions that described the
doctrine of separation."9 The Court recognized the influence of
the different views of Jefferson, Williams, and Madison on the
religion clauses,4 0 but failed to tie these views explicitly to some
basic framework that would make clear the exact harm that was
being prevented and the basic purpose that the Court was trying
to effect.41
The Court decided two establishment clause cases in 1968.
In Epperson v. Arkansas,'42 the Court struck down an "anti-
evolution" statute for the state's public schools. In Board of Ed-
ucation v. Allen,' a it upheld a New York program that called for
parochial school children to receive free textbooks on secular
subjects from public schools. The Court, in both these cases, os-
tensibly relied upon the "purpose and primary effect" test from
39. Id.
40. Id. at 214.
41. Cf. id. at 312-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting):
That the central value embodied in the First Amendment - and, more particu-
larly, in the guarantee of "liberty" contained in the Fourteenth - is the safe-
guarding of an individual's right to free exercise of his religion has been consist-
ently recognized....
It is this concept of constitutional protection embodied in our decisions which
makes the cases before us such difficult ones for me....
... What these cases compel.., is an analysis of just what the "neutrality" is
which is required by the interplay of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
of the First Amendment, as imbedded in the Fourteenth.
Id.
Justice Clark, author of the Schempp opinion, subsequently published a defense of
Schempp in which he managed to articulate a better justification for the governing prin-
ciples of separation and neutrality. See Clark, supra note 34.
[O]urs is a unique situation; people of more than three score nationalities, having
many basic differences in religious beliefs, have come to our shores and formed
our national citizenship. Consequently, when confronted by the challenges of this
religious pluralism our freedom in such matters can only be protected, as the Con-
stitution dictates - not by a wall between government and religion - but
through a wholesome separation of a concordant nature. Otherwise, we will find
ourselves in the midst of religious wars that would be destructive of our being. To
me the problem is just that simple.
Id. at 855.
42. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
43. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
[Vol. 8:249
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Schempp."
It was against this backdrop that the Court decided the case
of Walz v. Tax Commission41 in 1970. At issue was a New York
State property tax exemption accorded to a variety of institu-
tions engaged in "religious, education, or charitable purposes." '46
Did "separation" require that the state exclude religious organi-
zations from this financial benefit, or at least seek to measure
the degree to which each religious organization engaged in
wholly "education and charitable" functions, and prorate their
taxes accordingly? Or did "separation" require that the state
avoid intruding into the affairs of the religious organizations and
not place a special burden upon sectarian institutions engaging
in "educational and charitable" activities that was not placed on
similar secular organizations?4 7
The majority opinion of Chief Justice Burger recognized the
strong need for flexibility, "room for play in the joints, ' 48 if diffi-
cult questions such as the one presented were to be solved. What
the opinion failed to do was to state plainly and explicitly how
this was to be accomplished. The "purpose and primary effect"
test could provide little guidance here - whether the state dis-
allowed or permitted the tax exemption, the primary effect
would certainly be found either to aid or to hinder religion. The
Court instead proposed a new test to ensure that "benevolent
neutrality"4 9 was maintained: the new test prohibited "excessive
government entanglement with religion." 50 Under this standard,
the Court held that close regulation of religious organizations
would involve a greater degree of government entanglement than
would the allowance of the exemption. 1 Many no doubt agreed
with the majority's statement that "the purpose [of the religion
44. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 243 (1968).
45. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
46. Id. at 666-67.
47. See id. at 668: "The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the
Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on as-
pects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have lim-
ited meaning as general principles." Id.
48. Id. at 669.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 674.
51. Id. at 674-76.
1988]
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clauses] was to state an objective, not to write a statute,"5 but
could only conjecture as to what the Court believed that objec-
tive to be."
The following term, in Lemon," the Court combined the
two tests developed in Schempp and Walz into a single, three-
pronged test.5 5 The failure to enunciate a clear underlying prin-
ciple might never have become a major problem had the Court
not been forced to grapple with the problems created by state
aid to sectarian institutions.5 The Lemon test, standing alone,
simply could not provide clear guidance on this issue. The
strong secular state interests involved,8 the legacy of the result
52. Id. at 668.
53. Professor Kauper and Professor Katz both hailed the Walz decision as giving
implied recognition to some substantive normative principles underlying the religion
clauses. See Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 69 MICH. L. REv. 179, 201 (1970):
[Wihile the entanglements terminology is new, the substance of the idea as an
important consideration in the interpretation of the establishment clause is not.
Underlying the twin religion clauses of the first amendment is the idea that the
state and the churches have separate functions to perform and that the state may
neither intrude into the affairs of the churches nor actively intervene in religious
matters.
Id. See also Katz, supra note 13.
54. 403 U.S. 602.
55. Id. at 612-13. For the Lemon test, see supra note 4.
56. Compare the clarity of Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982)
(Lemon test applied to grant of zoning authority to religious institutions) with the confu-
sion of Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (attempt to apply Lemon to various forms
of nonfinancial aid to sectarian schools).
57. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loan of services and instruc-
tional materials to nonpublic schools); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S.
736 (1976) (state grants to religiously affiliated colleges); Wolman, 433 U.S. 229. Perhaps
no more need be said about these cases than that none of them contained an opinion
that was able to command, in its entirety, a clear majority of the Court. The Court's
frustration was expressed in Justice White's majority opinion in Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980): "[Our] course sacrifices clarity and predictabil-
ity for flexibilty, but this promises to be the case until the continuing interaction be-
tween the courts and the States . . . produces a single, more encompassing construction
of the Establishment Clause." Id. Such a lack of predictability could be acceptable if the
values that the Court was seeking to effect were clearly understood. Since they are not,
the Court's forays in this area have not only been frustrating, but a potential threat as
well to individual religious liberty. Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (creche in
city erected Christmas display).
58. See Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF.
L. REV. 260, 283 (1968) ("At least some governmental aid to support parochial education
serves a primary or independent secular purpose. No one can deny the state's legitimate
interest in improving the educational quality of all schools .... ); Kauper, The Supreme
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/2
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of Everson,59 and the endless myriad of subtle forms such aid
can assume would have made these cases difficult to adjudicate
even with a recognized substantive principle of religious liberty
as a reference point. It was soon apparent that the Court was
running on a treadmill and that the Lemon test was resting on
weak foundations."
Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CASE W. REs. 107, 128 (1974)
(importance of parochial schools in "maintaining a pluralistic society and preserving
freedom of choice"); Nowak, The Supreme Court, The Religion Clauses and the Nation-
alization of Education, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 883, 895 (1976) ("[Tlhe question must [be]
faced as to whether or not the state will offer alternative forms of subsidized education
so that citizens individually may choose a form of education other than that which is
provided in kind by the government."). Accord Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compul-
sory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 220
(1973):
The Pierce case has long been a problem in the church and state area. For if there
is a state imposed duty to attend schools, there is nonetheless a right to secure the
education that the state compels in private schools. These schools, it is frequently
alleged, are performing a state function for which they are entitled to payment
from the public coffers. The question . . . is not likely to be answered with any
finality so long as both Pierce and the compulsory education laws must be
reconciled.
Id.
59. See Kirby, Everson to Meek and Roemer: From Separation to Detente in
Church-State Relations, 55 N.C.L. REv. 563, 564 (1977): "[Everson] may hold the record
for being cited most often as a precedent on opposite sides of the same question." Id.
60. See Clark, Comments on Some Policies Underlying the Constitutional Law of
Religious Freedom, 64 MINN. L. REV. 453, 457-58 (1980):
[I]t is really a nontest .... You can put the conclusion on such a law that it does
or does not benefit religion and that's its purpose, but how does a court decide
that? What is the functional test that tells us whether the purpose and effect are
predominantly religious or secular?
Id. See also Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Sectarian Schools: A Study in Corrosive
Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REv. 783, 818 (1978):
In the context of governmental aid to sectarian schools, the Court has been an-
swering questions of degree in relation to an inappropriate set of principles, prin-
ciples which have lost whatever efficacy they may once have had as viable consti-
tutional standards. The materials and structure of the conceptual framework do
not match.
Id.; Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 19-20 (1978). "The entangle-
ment part of the Court's triad is either empty or nonsensical .... [T]he [Lemon test]
hardly elucidates the Court's judgments. Nor does it cover the plastic nature of the judg-
ments in this area. Judicial discretion, rather than constitutional mandate, control the
results." Id.
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III. The Underlying Value
What is "religious liberty?" What are the evils to be pre-
vented by the religion clauses? How do the two clauses interact
with one another?
An underlying principle in constitutional law sets down a
normative statement concerning the relationship between the in-
dividual and the general community." When the Court articu-
lates an underlying principle, it necessarily elevates a certain
value or set of values and creates, in effect, a sacred cow. The
Court subsequently subordinates certain expressions of majority
will through legislative enactment, long standing historical cus-
toms or common-law rules, and even competing inferior, individ-
ual constitutional claims to this particular principle when they
conflict. The commitment to a broad concept of "speech, 6 2 i.e.,
to a society in which ideas and opinions are afforded the widest
possible scope and protection, stands out as one such principle:
it states a normative belief that under our Constitution, the
proper relationship between the individual and the general com-
munity requires open debate and exchange of views, to the end
that each entity may in such a way function at its fullest poten-
tial. The doctrine against prior restraints is one governing prin-
61. The term "general community" refers to society in the classical liberal sense, as
a nexus of social relationships between individuals of equal intrinsic worth, expressing
and acting through some form of representative institution. See generally A. MACINTYRE,
A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 157-89 (1966). See also Note, Reinterpreting the Religion
Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1468, 1471 (1984).
62. The questions concerning the proper scope and substantive contents of such
normative principles, the proper sources for deriving such principles, and whether indeed
the judiciary possesses, as an institution, sufficient competence to articulate such princi-
ples are, of course, in themselves a separate genre of constitutional law. See generally J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 469 (1981); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U.
CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971).
The proper scope of the underlying principle for the free speech clause remains
widely debated. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 62; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The point, though, is that the Court, when confronted
with a claim brought under the free speech clause, explicitly references the facts of the
case against an articulated underlying principle, in order to balance out the competing
interests of the individual and the general community. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971).
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ciple intended to effect this end;a" the rule imposing an excessive
burden on public figure plaintiffs in libel suits64 is another.
The religion clauses of the first amendment require a com-
mitment to a broad concept of religious liberty. This requires a
commitment to a society in which an individual's entitlement to
equal standing within the general community may not be af-
fected either by the espousal or disaffirmance of any religious
beliefs.6 5 The religion clauses primarily achieve this commitment
by prohibiting any coercion, evaluation, or judgment whatsoever
of an individual's religious beliefs by the government.
A. The Separate Elements That Comprise the Value of Reli-
gious Liberty
The choices of whether or not to recognize some form of
transcendental force or power, or some personified embodiment
of such a force, and the manner chosen as to how such recogni-
63. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
64. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
65. Some recent commentators have suggested that a principle of equality provides
the essential underlying value of either one or both of the two clauses. One would even
go so far as to graft the analytical methodology of the equal protection clause onto the
Court's current establishment and free exercise clause jurisprudence. See Paulsen, supra
note 12. Professor Lupu stops far short of this innovative approach, arguing instead in
favor of an approach to the establishment clause that can ultimately be harmonized with
the underlying value of the equal protection clause:
Government action must advance public values in a manner consistent with a
framework within which all are treated as having equal worth. The constitutional
wrong committed by acts that discriminate against racial or ethnic minorities, for
example, is the failure to treat members of those groups as having such worth....
... [NIonestablishment parallels this more general requirement of equal re-
spect .... [Flavoring a preferred group may be as dangerous and disrespectful as
explicitly harming a hated group.
Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18
CONN. L. REv. 739, 745-46 (1986).
"Equal" religious liberty undoubtedly constitutes an essential element for individual
religious liberty, just as other individual liberties are necessarily dependent upon the
equal protection of the law. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)
(constitutional right to move from state to state penalized by welfare waiting period).
Attention must then focus upon government treatment of religion, in order to under-
stand exactly when and how forbidden inequalities may arise.
This analysis incorporates the necessity for equality in government treatment of all
religious beliefs, and between religious and nonreligious beliefs, as an element of the
principle of individual religious liberty. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82
(describing the "Madisonian" element).
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tion must be fulfilled and how such fulfillment shall relate to the
actions and behavior necessary to maintain one's existence, con-
stitute a fundamental aspect of the formation of an individual's
separate identity." The state may in no way influence this
choice, whether directly or implicitly. The public institutions
through which the general community usually manifests its col-
lective value judgments may not do so in regard to these mat-
ters. A substantive principle of religious liberty must represent
this guarantee. The notion of "separation of church and state"
represents the primary, but not the only governing principle
which achieves this guarantee.
Viewed in this manner, the inconsistencies present in the
Court's analyses of "separation" in Everson, McCollum, and Zo-
rach begin to fade, and Professor Katz's argument from 1953,
that "the limits of the separation doctrine are to be found by
reference to the constitutional principle of religious liberty, not
vice versa,"67 is vindicated. The doctrine of religious liberty pre-
supposes at least four different types of threats that the individ-
ual may encounter. Professor Katz correctly understood that the
probable intention of the Court in its first three establishment
clause cases was to explicate and flesh out this doctrine through
its analysis of the primary governing principle. 8 Unfortunately,
the Court apparently failed to grasp the crucial distinction be-
tween religious liberty - the end it was seeking - and separa-
tion - the means it was employing - to achieve that end.
"Separation of church and state" subsequently became elevated
to the level of a constitutional mandate, while a proper under-
standing of what was being separated and why separation was
necessary became obscured. 9
66. This Article recognizes the severe problems associated with any definition of re-
ligion. They are, for the most part, beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579.
67. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
68. Cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213 (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring): "[Algreement, in the abstract, that the First Amendment was
designed to erect a 'wall of separation between church and state,' does not preclude a
clash of views as to what the wall separates." Id.
69. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461-62 (separate opinion of Frank-
furter, J.): "[Tihe several opinions in Everson and McCollum [and in Zorach] make suf-
ficiently clear that 'separation' is not a self-defining concept." See also Giannella, Reli-
gious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development - Part 1. The Religious
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The first element of religious liberty seeks to keep the gen-
eral community free from any government-sponsored religious
influence. This element corresponds with the views attributed to
Jefferson and is best exemplified by the metaphor of "a wall of
separation."70 The primary concern of Jefferson lay in the possi-
bility that an organized church to which a majority of citizens
belonged would, with the acquiescence of that majority, gain in-
fluence over the functions of government. The premise of this
view rests on the idea that such a majority religious viewpoint,
in union with government, could severely burden the ability of
the nonconforming individual to believe as (s)he would other-
wise choose. Such a burden could take several forms: condition-
ing the receipt of certain privileges or benefits upon adherence
to the majority belief,7' exalting in some way the beliefs and
manners of worship of the majority," or mandating adherence to
the majority belief as a qualification for holding a position of
public office.73
The government could on the other hand adhere to a policy
that provided for the widest possible measure of protection and
toleration for minority religious viewpoints, yet choose to sup-
port the majority beliefs through the expenditure of public
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1967):
[T]he establishment clause embodies a concept of separation of church and state
which takes on precise meaning only in light of prevailing assumptions as to the
appropriate sphere of action for each institution. As the role of the state, with the
passage of time, transcends traditional boundaries and assumes new dimensions,
the idiomatic meaning of "separation" must be revised to conform with the new
realities if original purposes and expectations are to be realized.
Id.
70. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1978) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's
letter to the Danbury Baptist Ass'n).
71. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985) (state an-
tidiscrimination statute limited to adherents of Sabbatarian beliefs).
72. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (bible read-
ing in public schools).
73. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (oath as to belief in God re-
quired for public office). See also T. JEFFERSON, supra note 13:
[O]ur civil rights have no dependance [sic] on our religious opinions, any more
than our opinions in physics and geometry; that therefore the proscribing any citi-
zen as unworthy of the public confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of
being called to offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess or renounce this
or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges and ad-
vantages to which, in common with his fellow citizens, he has a natural right ....
Id. at 545-46.
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funds. Although this places no direct burden upon any noncon-
forming individual, such action constitutes a clear statement by
the government as to the "worth" of different religious beliefs.
Those who do not adhere to a religious faith that receives such
public aid may perceive that they do not stand upon an equal
footing with those that do so adhere, especially if support
through taxes for the preferred beliefs stands as a price for be-
longing to the general community.7 4 If government behavior
compromises in any way the equal standing of an individual
within the general community because of his religious belief, it
necessarily compromises the freedom of the individual to
choose. 5
The second element of religious liberty seeks affirmatively
to protect religious beliefs from hostile or ignorant government
intrusion. This element corresponds to the views attributed to
Roger Williams and may be described by the metaphor of a
"wall between the garden and the wilderness. 7' This view rests
on the idea that both the state and the church have separate,
distinct functions to perform in their relation to the individual.77
If government in some way limits the ability of the church to
perform its functions, the ultimate effect will be to limit in some
way the religious liberty of the individual. This type of limita-
74. See Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692, 720 (1968): "[T]he ultimate fear is that government aid will, directly or
indirectly, be used to influence choice of religion, not merely to enhance another's exer-
cise. And it is this fear which causes strife and which makes use of the nonbeliever's or
other-believer's taxes so galling." Id. See also Lupu, supra note 65, at 743: "The threat
to equal religious liberty is now the more subtle one of cultural and political insensitivity
to those who do not share the dominant Christian ethos." Id.
75. See Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 Sup. CT. REV.
193, 212: "[Tlhe Establishment Clause, no less than the Equal Protection Clause, is wor-
ried about the psychic and moral affront from discrimination, and that evil is likelier to
ensue from general favoritism of religion than it is from special consideration of a dis-
tinct minority ...." Id. (emphasis added).
76. See Katz, supra note 13.
77. "[Tlhe First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and govern-
ment can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within
its respective sphere." McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
See also Kauper, supra note 53. Accord Note, supra note 61, at 1483: "Because the
wall of separation should preserve two distinct sources of influence on the individual, any
attempt by the state either to combine the influence of government and religion or to
displace religious influence is a threat to the plurality protected by the establishment
clause." Id.
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tion might stem from direct hostility 78 or could result from the
benign appropriation by government of some symbol or ritual
sacred to the church for the furtherance of secular purposes.7 9
Thus any government action that adversely affects the ability of
a church's or religious group's efforts to perform its proper func-
tion vis-A-vis the individual represents an intrusion by the state
into an area in which it has no competence to act.
The third element of religious liberty seeks to limit the po-
tential for strife along sectarian lines and encourages broad reli-
gious pluralism. This element corresponds with the views of
James Madison and acts to remove religious beliefs as matters of
public debate and legislative concern. 0 A necessary corollary of
the first two elements, this view requires more than the absence
of any government expression of endorsement or hostility to-
wards particular religious beliefs. It affirmatively states the ne-
cessity for equal concern and respect for all sects and individual
adherents of nonconforming beliefs.81 The fundamental role that
the choices in matters of religious belief play in the formation of
an individual's identity necessarily precludes those beliefs from
ever becoming matters to be judged by public consensus. Re-
moving the functions of government from potential religious
78. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (law aimed at hindering fund-
raising efforts of nonmainstream sects).
79. See, e.g., Engel v, Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (recitation of state composed
prayer). Such an appropriation could severely alter the meaning inherent within the
symbol or ritual that the church wishes to convey; it could strip away from an individual
the significance and meaning (s)he had formerly obtained from the church. Cf. Stone, In
Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 823, 829 (1983):
[T]he very concept of a "nondenominational prayer" is self-contradictory. There
are well over fifty different theistic sects in the United States, each of which has
its own tenets regarding the appropriate nature and manner of prayer. Any effort
to compose a truly nondenominational prayer must thus produce, at best, a sterile
litany virtually devoid of true religious meaning.
Id. Accord Clark, supra note 41, at 864:
[Olne of the lawyers in the Schempp case argued that "public school recitation of
the Lord's Prayer is not a religious act but a mere exercise in civic morality."
Professor Katz points out that the "danger" is that children might regard all
prayer in this light. I would only add from my observation that rather than "a
danger" the Professor has uncovered a reality.
Id.
80. See Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, re-
printed in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (app. to opinion of Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting).
81. See Lupu, supra note 65.
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utilization diminishes the chances for discord between compet-
ing sects, insofar as the incentive for such discord disappears.8 2
The above three elements of the principle of religious lib-
erty - prevention of religious influence over government, pro-
hibition against government intrusion into religion, and avoid-
ance of religio-political factionalism - are properly considered
primarily as establishment clause values. The clause affirma-
tively limits the power of government to act, adhere to, or entan-
gle itself with religious beliefs.8 3 The doctrine of "separation of
church and state" may be applied to effect any one of these
three values, as the Court evidently did in Everson, McCollum,
and Zorach. But "separation" cannot serve as an end in itself.
There exists still another element to the principle of religious
liberty, one equally crucial to the other three in protecting the
free choice of the individual in matters of religious belief. Gov-
ernment may act in a manner wholly compatible with the first
three elements, yet inadvertently incur the effect of infringing
upon the free choice of an individual.8 4 Under these narrow cir-
cumstances, if government cannot demonstrate a sufficiently
compelling justification for the imposition of such a burden, the
individual should be exempted from the requirements of the leg-
islation that has caused the infringement. Such action clearly
82. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall - A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L. J. 770, 777-78 (1984):
The Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, of 1785, in-
veighed against the risk that "the Civil Magistrate... may employ Religion as an
engine of Civil policy," and equally against the infusion of any particular religion
within government "because it will have a like tendency to banish our Citizens,"
i.e., to make them aliens to their own government. Competition among religions
for position within government must be avoided so that none need fear any other,
as each might otherwise seek its own establishment through government or within
government.
Id.
83. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961) (separate opinion of
Frankfurter, J.). "The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate leg-
islative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct:
man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression
in action of that belief or disbelief." Id. (emphasis added).
84. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exemption from.compulsory
education laws); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (exemption from state unem-
ployment benefits requirements due to Sabbatarian beliefs); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987) (exemption from state unemployment benefits
requirements due to Sabbatarian beliefs).
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cannot be squared with any concept of "separation." This ele-
ment of permissible exemption may be considered primarily as
the value of the free exercise clause.
8 5
No clear demarcation exists between the two clauses; the es-
tablishment clause and the free exercise clause together com-
prise the full constitutional embodiment of the principle of reli-
gious liberty."' Any attempt to confine a particular element of
the principle to one clause or the other will ultimately produce
the exact type of "tension" that has been said to exist between
the two clauses. The tension, of course, cannot and does not lie
between the establishment and free exercise clauses as such, but
between the different elements themselves. 7 For example, the
Williams element of religious liberty, the need to keep religious
beliefs secure from hostile or ignorant government intrusion,
may properly be said in many instances to arise equally as either
an establishment or as a free exercise claim.8 That an action
undertaken pursuant to this value may conflict with the Jeffer-
sonian80 element does not imply a conflict between the clauses
85. A full explication of the element of "permissible exemption" requires, and re-
gretfully must await, a complete article in itself. For a recent provocative discussion of
the proper scope and application of the Free Exercise Clause and its underlying values,
see Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employ-
ment Discrimination, 67 B.U.L. REV. 391 (1987).
86. "Although a distinct jurisprudence has enveloped each [clause], their common
purpose is to secure [individual] religious liberty." Wallace v. Jafree, 105 S. Ct. 2479,
2496 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. See id. at 2504:
[O]ne can plausibly assert that government pursues free exercise clause values
when it lifts a government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion. If a
statute falls within this category, then the standard Establishment Clause test
should be modified accordingly. It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular
purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the free exercise of
religion by lifting a government-imposed burden. Instead, the Court should simply
acknowledge that the religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by the Free
Exercise Clause.
Id.
88. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct.
2718 (1986) (contention that statute forbidding sex discrimination may not be applied in
context of pregnant school teacher dismissed on basis of school's religious tenet requiring
mothers of preschool children to remain at home with their children).
89. See Paulsen, supra note 12, at 322: "[Tjhe Court has not realized the full extent
to which Jeffersonian 'separation' and Madisonian 'neutrality' can be at war with one
another." Id. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax ex-
emptions for religious organizations).
No case to date has brought this potential conflict into focus as sharply as the
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Court's decision this past term in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S.
Ct. 2862 (1987). At issue was the constitutionality of section 702 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended in 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982). Section 702 exempts from the
general provisions of Title VII, "a religious corporation, association, educational institu-
tion, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educa-
tional institution, or society of its activities."
Section 702 had been extended in 1972 beyond its original exemption, which had
applied solely to religious activities. One reason for this had been to avoid having courts
intrude into the internal functioning of religious organizations in order to determine
whether a given activity was "religious," see Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2866 n.9, an enterprise
the district court in Amos nonetheless felt compelled to undertake, in order to weigh the
constitutionality of section 702 under the establishment clause. See Amos v. Corporation
of the Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791, 799 (D. Utah 1984). For a criticism of the test
utilized by the district court judge in Amos, see Lupu, supra note 85, at 392-95 n.10.
At issue in Amos was whether the Church of Latter Day Saints could terminate the
employment of an employee in a gymnasium owned and operated by the church solely on
religious grounds. The lower court held that the gymnasium, though operating on a non-
profit basis, was not connected to the "religious" activities of the church and that the
application of section 702 to the nonreligious activities of the church violated the estab-
lishment clause, by conferring a benefit on the church that invariably could not pass
muster under the "effects" prong of the Lemon test.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed; the majority opinion of Justice White,
however, failed to take cognizance of the conflict of values presented by section 702.
Instead, the majority mechanically applied the Lemon test and upheld the statute. To do
so, the Court was forced to draw a highly attenuated distinction in applying the "effects"
prong, stating, "[flor a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say
that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influ-
ence." Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2869 (emphasis in original).
This once again illustrates the danger of applying a governing principle or judicial
test without guidance from an accepted underlying principle. As Justice O'Connor ob-
served in her separate concurrence, "[tihis distinction seems to me to obscure far more
than to enlighten. Almost any government benefit to religion could be recharacterized as
simply 'allowing' a religion to better advance itself . Id. at 2874 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
Justice Brennan addressed the conflict directly, noting that the exemption contained
in section 702 "is in serious tension with our commitment to individual freedom of con-
science in matters of religious belief." Id. at 2871 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted). Recognizing that only by reference to a further underlying value could the
tension be reconciled, he wrote:
For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from
participation in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an
ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere ag-
gregation of individuals. Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of
an organization's religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission
should conduct them, is thus a means by which a religious community defines
itself. Solicitude for a church's ability to do so reflects the idea that furtherance
of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious
freedom as well.
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Each clause has its own proper function and scope. The es-
tablishment clause exists as a broad, specific, content-based lim-
itation on government behavior.90 The free exercise clause, on
the other hand, serves a far narrower, though no less vital pur-
pose. It "constitutes a unique acknowledgement of the occa-
sional primacy of faith in an otherwise secular state."9' Fidelity
to the idea of protection for the individual choice in matters of
religious belief requires the avoidance of a forced choice between
adherence to the dictates imposed by such beliefs and (absent a
''compelling" government interest) compliance with government
rules. The two clauses overlap in many ways, but each also
serves a vital purpose on its own. The resolution of any tension
that may exist between the different elements of the principle of
religious liberty must ultimately rest with the underlying princi-
ple itself, and not by resort to "separation," the Lemon test, or
any other articulated governing principle.92
Unless we clearly understand the underlying principle
sought to be effected, application of a governing principle
through some test such as Lemon will prove a frustrating,
counterintuitive exercise. The consistent application of the doc-
trine of "separation" could offer great clarity to this area, but
would not always further the principle of religious liberty.
B. Religious Liberty and the Values Underlying the First
Amendment
The first amendment seeks to protect the autonomy of each
individual by limiting the power of government to intrude
within a sphere of beliefs, ideas, and expressions. The legitimacy
Id. at 2871-72 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also id. at 2874 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
90. See supra note 83.
91. Lupu, supra note 65, at 761.
92. See Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of
Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CM. L. REv. 805, 815 (1978) (arguing that
the Supreme Court should hold that the central value in the religion clauses "is the
protection of individual choice in matters of religion, and that an expansive protection of
all such choices does not constitute an impermissible establishment of religion") (empha-
sis omitted); contra Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the
First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213 (1973) (arguing that stan-
dard of strict neutrality does not permit any government classifications on the basis of
religion).
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of our system of government derives from a fiction of some form
of individual consent. This fiction may only be maintained
through explicit recognition of the autonomy of the individual in
determining the choices that (s)he believes to be essential to the
self-definition of his/her identity."3 The concept of our govern-
ment as one of limited powers mandates that our government
may not, consistent with the premises on which it rests, intrude
within the realm that constitutes the identity of the individual."
The first amendment makes explicit the role of the sphere of
beliefs, ideas, and expression within the context of the relation-
ship of the individual to the general community, and thus pro-
tects the legitimacy of our system of government by forbidding
such government action that could, by its interference within
the protected sphere, destroy the fiction of consent. 5
Within the sphere of beliefs, ideas, and expressions, the
Framers explicitly chose to distinguish matters of religion from
matters of nonreligion. For the protection of all nonreligious be-
liefs, ideas, and expressions, the Framers deemed it sufficient to
include the speech clause alone; the individual receives the wid-
est possible scope of protection for his/her choice of beliefs, but
(s)he is not guaranteed an environment in which the state is
prohibited from exerting indirect pressure on that choice, either
through consensus, or some form of official government
"speech." The powerful restrictions on government behavior
mandated by the establishment clause apply only to matters of
93. See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1120-25 (1979)
(citing Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 204
(1972)) (an analysis of the Millian principle of free expression).
94. See Wellington, supra note 93, at 1121-22: "[Tihe First Amendment ... is not
an individual right, but a limitation on the authority of government .... [Ilt derives
from the proposition 'that a legitimate government is one whose authority citizens can
recognize while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.' " Id.
Accord Lupu, supra note 65, at 772: "Compulsion of belief, designed to lure and rein-
force political or religious commitment, is in direct conflict with the intellectual skepti-
cism on which the continuing consent of the governed depends. The democratic society
envisioned by the Constitution and its architects thus depends on freedom of belief." Id.
95. Wellington, supra note 93, at 1123. Nowhere has this principle found purer ex-
pression than in the subtly poetic phrasing of Justice Jackson: "If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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religious belief. Religion differs in kind, and not just degree,
from other beliefs, ideas, and expressions; the values protected
by the elements of the principle of religious liberty in some ways
run directly counter to other underlying principles of the first
amendment.9 6 Consider this distinction: for nonreligious ideas,
we often seek a judgment of veracity within some comprehensi-
ble parameters; we speak of "political truths," "historical
truths," "scientific truths," and the like, establishing mutable
conventions through accepted criteria (usually some form of con-
sensus), or long-standing custom and usage. The underlying
principle of the speech clause requires that we accept the muta-
bility of such "truths" and the degree of protection we accord to
dissent and disagreement."7
For religious beliefs, we eschew such notions of "truth."'98
96. Compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("[A] function of free
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with condi-
tions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.") with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
622 (1971) ("Ordinarily political debate and division... are normal and healthy manifes-
tations of our democratic system of government, but political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect.").
97. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
[Wlhen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id. (emphasis added).
98. In United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, No. 85-5959,
slip op. (D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 1987), the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held
that the extension by Congress of the copyright to the works of Mary Baker Eddy "posi-
tively offends our constitutional tradition." Id. at 30. After finding that the copyright
extension effectively prevented a dissident sect of Christian Scientists from publishing
their own interpretive version of the writings of the founder of their movement, the court
stated that there
is the common understanding that the domain of religious conviction is pervaded
by heterogeneity of viewpoint and continuing debate over religious truth. Govern-
ment is therefore barred from assuming a position in the debate by attempting to
establish religious truth by fiat. In matters of religion, truth, including purity of
doctrinal statement, is left for the citizenry to determine by persuasion, not for
resolution by exertion of governmental authority.
Id. at 31-32 (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (truth or falsity of an
individual's religious beliefs cannot be made the subject of a criminal trial)).
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Further, once an individual has made the choices necessary to
determine what (s)he believes to be "religious truth," the princi-
ple of religious liberty requires not only that the general commu-
nity accept the immutability of the individual's choice, but also
that no judgment of the veracity of such beliefs be expressed
and that (except when required by the element of permissible
exemption that underlies the free exercise clause) these beliefs
be completely irrelevant to the manner in which the state
chooses to interact with the individual.
IV. Applying the Principle of Religious Liberty
A. Avoiding the Extremes
Much of the recent debate regarding the establishment
clause has focused on the proper weight that historical evidence
of the Framers' intentions should receive. One viewpoint seeks
to assert the "absolutist" view espoused by the Court in Ever-
son99 and the writings of Jefferson and Madison relied on by the
Court therein.100 The opposing viewpoint argues in favor of a
"revisionist" approach.' 1 Proponents of this perspective con-
tend that the historical record proves that the views arguably
held by Jefferson and Madison differed greatly from the views of
the representatives who adopted, and the people who ratified,
the religion clauses along with the remaining provisions of the
Bill of Rights.10 2 "Revisionists" have vigorously sought, in the
past few years, recognition of a far narrower interpretation of
the establishment clause, claiming that the true intent of the
Founding Fathers was merely to prevent the establishment of a
national church and the advancement or disparagement of any
99. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
100. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2488 (1985). See also Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The
Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REv. 561 (1980);
Drakeman, Antidisestablishmentarianism: The Latest (and Longest) Word from the
Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 153 (1983).
101. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668; Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2508 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See also R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); Dunsford,
Prayer in the Well: Some Heretical Reflections on the Establishment Syndrome, 1984
UTAH L. REv. 1 (1984).
102. See generally R. CORD, supra note 101.
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one religion at the expense of others. 03 They argue that Everson
and the doctrine of "separation" rest on faulty historical and le-
gal analysis, and thus should no longer be followed.10 4
The unfortunate aspect of this debate stems from the in-
ability of either position to take satisfactory cognizance of the
principle of religious liberty.10 5 "Revisionists" belabor the obvi-
ous flaws inherent in the doctrine of separation; 06 "absolutists"
steadfastly hold to the words of Jefferson and Madison.1 0 7
Neither position avoids the pitfall of begging the essential
question.
The failure of the "absolutist" position stems from the im-
possibility, as a practical matter, of such a complete separation
existing in the society in which we live today. The role of the
government pervades our lives to the point where no institution
of society may achieve the total insulation that the "absolutist"
approach requires. 0 8 The Court has recognized this fact;' 09 it
has not, however, articulated any coherent rationale for parsing
out the types of involvements between state and religious insti-
tutions that are arguably permissible under the religion clauses
as tolerable "acknowledgements" and those involvements that
may result in "the power, prestige and financial support of gov-
ernment [placing] indirect coercive pressure upon religious mi-
norities to conform to the prevailing officially approved reli-
gion. .. .
Whereas the problem with the "absolutist" position lies in
103. See Jafiree, 105 S. Ct. at 2508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. See Dunsford, supra note 101, at 20: "As a fountainhead for doctrine, Everson
is a polluted source. The opinion is shabby history and unacceptable legal analysis." Id.
105. "Each theory is incomplete - each focuses on only one value because it can-
not accommodate the other, apparently irreconcilable, values protected by the clauses.
Paradoxically, however, this perceived irreconcilability stems from a conception of
human identity shared by all three theories." Note, supra note 61, at 1469 (discussing
three perspectives). See Devins and Feder, First Amendment's Religion Clauses: Bal-
ancing Two Contrasting Views, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 24.
106. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-73 (1984); Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2508 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
107. See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2488-89; Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. See Gianella, supra note 69.
109. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious peo-
ple whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.").
110. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
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its overinclusiveness, the "revisionist" viewpoint leads to results
that can directly contravene the principle of religious liberty and
may lead the government to intrude within the sphere of beliefs,
ideas, and expressions protected by the first amendment by per-
ceptibly burdening the free choice of individuals in matters of
religious belief. In Lynch v. Donnelly,"' the Court upheld the
inclusion of a nativity scene by a municipal government as part
of an overall holiday display. The Court's holding provides an
example both of the adoption of the "revisionist" perspective" 2
and the dangers inherent in the Court's failure to proscribe cer-
tain types of church-state interaction." 3
The Jeffersonian element of religious liberty protects the
general community from any government-sponsored religious in-
fluence."" In this instance, the municipal government closely
identified itself with a symbol that contains extreme religious
significance for a majority of its citizens. The message conveyed
by such a union of church and state can be very powerful: while
in no way disparaging any other religious beliefs, the govern-
ment's action can be interpreted as a clear statement to the gen-
eral community that those religious beliefs are the ones it wishes
to exalt. Our representative system guarantees that when the
government acts on behalf of a majority of the general commu-
nity, an individual is free to accept or dissent from that decision.
However, when a government act is based on matters of religious
belief, the Court should not uphold such government behav-
ior." ' Any action undertaken by the state that exalts the major-
ity religious beliefs will necessarily affect the manner in which a
nonadherent may relate to the general community. The fact that
one may freely disregard the municipality's active involvement
111. 465 U.S. 668.
112. The "revisionist" perspective applies a governing principle of "accommoda-
tion," rather than "separation" or "neutrality." See id. at 673: "[The Constitution] af-
firmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any." Id. (emphasis added).
113. See Van Alstyne, supra note 82, at 786 (viewing Lynch as part of a national
trend, "a movement of gradual, secularized Christian ethnocentrism, [that] has tended to
elude the establishment clause itself.").
114. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
115. "To be so excluded on religious grounds by one's elected government is an in-
sult and an injury that, until today, could not be countenanced by the Establishment
Clause." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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with a creche is irrelevant if such involvement results in the per-
ception that the government is making a statement as to the rel-
ative "worth" of any form of religious belief."6
The Williams element of religious liberty protects religious
beliefs from government intrusion."' In Lynch, the government
utilized a symbol to which holders of certain religious beliefs at-
tach great significance. Most adherents of those beliefs probably
approved of the manner in which the municipal government rec-
ognized their views. A few may have felt offended by the govern-
ment's chosen manner of utilization. For some others, the city's
appropriation of the religious symbol for its own avowedly secu-
lar purposes may have altered, or in some way diminished the
meaning which they had previously obtained from that symbol.
The state's method of appropriation, whether favorable or dis-
favorable to the holders of the beliefs involved, does not alter
the analysis." 8 When government deliberately chooses to involve
itself in a matter of religious significance, it causes matters of
religious belief to become relevant to the manner in which the
individual relates to the general community. Interaction with
the individual in matters of religious belief must remain the sole
province of the church." 9
116. As discussed later, government behavior that may readily be seen as pertaining
to a particular set of religious beliefs presents perhaps the most egregious type of threat
to the principle of religious liberty. See infra text accompanying notes 129-131.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
118. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The second purpose of separation and neutrality is to keep the state from
interfering in the essential autonomy of religious life, either by taking upon itself
the decision of religious issues, or by unduly involving itself in the supervision of
religious institutions or officials.
The third purpose of separation and neutrality is to prevent the trivialization
and degradation of religion by too close an attachment to the organs of govern-
ment. The Establishment Clause "stands as an expression of principle on the part
of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too
holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate."
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
119. See United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, No. 85-
5959, slip op. at 27 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 1987) ("It is not the function of government to
promote religious worship, to enable a religious entity to control statements of church
doctrine, or to guide a 'confused' public to 'correct' religious authority."). See also Gi-
anella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development - Part II:
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 517 (1968):
Religious voluntarism, of course, is an important aspect of the freedom of con-
science guaranteed by the free exercise clause. But a broad interpretation of the
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The Madisonian element of religious liberty protects the
general community against strife along sectarian lines, and seeks
to protect equal standing within the general community among
all sects and individual adherents, by withdrawing matters of re-
ligious beliefs from the public executive and legislative fo-
rums. 120 Even absent the dangers that exist from the perception
of such behavior, the utilization by government of a symbol with
deep religious significance threatens religious equality, in that
individuals can be made to feel more or less a part of the general
community on the basis of religious beliefs. 2' When matters of
religious belief become the subject of public debate, a strong
threat arises that the individual choice may be affected by some
consensus of the general community.
establishment clause also gives vent to the social dimension of this value by re-
stricting the use of political power in shaping the ideological and sociological
forces which give social form to religion. The growth and advancement of a reli-
gious sect must come from the voluntary support of its membership. Religious
voluntarism thus conforms to that abiding part of the American credo which as-
sumes that both religion and society will be strengthened if spiritual and ideologi-
cal claims seek recognition on the basis of their intrinsic merit. Institutional inde-
pendence of churches is thought to guarantee the purity and vigor of their role in
society, and the free competition of faiths and ideas is expected to guarantee their
excellence and vitality to the benefit of the entire society.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
121. Laws or practices that purport to treat equally all religions, or religion and
nonreligion, must nonetheless receive careful scrutiny, in order to ensure that the bene-
fits extended are genuinely available to all on an equal basis, and not just subject to the
tastes of a particular majority. One rationale proffered in favor of the placement of reli-
gious symbols, such as nativity scenes on public property, argues that so long as the same
benefit in principle extends equally to all religious groups, no constitutional infirmity
exists. In practice, however, if the benefit fails to extend past the adherents of majority
or mainstream religions, then the clear effect is that matters of religious belief are in
some manner being affected by some consensus of the general community. Cf. Marsh,
463 U.S. at 822-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
In a democratically elected legislature, the religious beliefs of the chaplain tend to
reflect the faith of the majority of the lawmakers' constituents. Prayers may be
said by a Catholic priest in the Massachusetts Legislature and by a Presbyterian
minister in the Nebraska Legislature, but I would not expect to find a Jehovah's
Witness or a disciple of Mary Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as the
official chaplain in any state legislature.
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B. A Proposed Methodology: Drawing Fine Lines
In order to apply the principle of religious liberty in an ef-
fort to balance the competing, and sometimes conflicting, ele-
ments, courts will have to draw many fine lines. A distinction
must be recognized between "acknowledgement" and "endorse-
ment." The former term should be defined as those examples of
government involvement with religion that do not violate the
underlying principle of freedom of choice in matters of religious
belief for each individual. How does government conduct rise to
the level where it might be said to affect the individual con-
science in matters of belief? The line should be drawn at action
by the state that places an imprimatur of approval or disap-
proval upon any particular set of beliefs. Such an imprimatur
represents a statement by the government to the general com-
munity as to the "truth" contained in a particular set of
beliefs.122
The difficulty adheres, of course, in defining such an "impri-
matur." Applying the three part Lemon test to make this deter-
mination only begs the question. The law that mandates the
printing of "In God We Trust" on all United States currency 23
appears to have a clear religious purpose, yet may not constitute
any more than a permissible acknowledgement of religion;12" the
122. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
123. 31 U.S.C. § 5112 (1982).
124. The questions presented by such omnipresent reminders of a deific presence in
our society are difficult. Whatever the range, if any, of acceptable "acknowledgements"
such as "In God We Trust," it must not be allowed to infringe the free choice of those
who hold atheistic or nontheistic beliefs. "[T]he individual freedom of conscience pro-
tected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none
at all." Jafjree, 105 S. Ct. at 2488.
Perhaps the rote repetition of such affirmations of faith ultimately dispel any gov-
ernment imprimatur that would otherwise be. (This, of course, raises objections as well.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-119.) As one commentator has suggested:
Though government indeed "follows the best of our traditions" when it seeks
to accommodate the religious beliefs of its people, the boundaries of such accom-
modation [can] extend no further than the genuine need for such accommodation.
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that certain ceremonial or traditional
invocations of religion by the state may be so embedded in the community's con-
sciousness as to negate their "suspect" character (though not their religious
character).
Paulsen, supra note 12, at 342 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
The evil to be avoided lies in the perception that government has in some way made
1988]
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placing of a creche in a municipal Christmas display may per-
haps have a clear secular purpose, but ultimately constitutes an
impermissible endorsement. The answer must lie within some
form of a "reasonable person" standard of perception.125 An ad-
a statement that pertains to the "truth" contained in some matter of religious belief. The
closer the interaction between the state and a particular set of beliefs, the greater the
danger of such an imprimatur. Conversely, if government treats with religion in a broad,
amorphous manner, the danger correspondingly decreases. See infra notes 130-131.
Some objective standard or criterion must lie in order to delineate between "the
genuine threat" and the "mere shadow." School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). If no such distinction existed, then virtually
any type of government behavior could, in theory, be said in some way to intrude imper-
missibly upon some individual's free choice in matters of religious belief. See, e.g., Crow-
ley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (museum display on "The Emer-
gence of Man" alleged to establish secular humanism as a religion); Grove v. Mead
School Dist., 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985) (assignment of The Learning Tree to high
school literature class alleged to establish secular humanism); Smith v. Board of School
Comm'rs of Mobile County, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th
Cir. 1987) (district court held that home economics text books that emphasize the role of
the individual in moral choices, and history textbooks that fail to emphasize the impor-
tance of religion in American history and contemporary American society, impermissibly
constituted an establishment of secular humanism). By the same token, we need some
basis for distinguishing between study of the Bible for historical purposes in the public
classrooms, and its use as a religious exercise. Cf. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (Bible-read-
ing required in public schools).
Several factors may be utilized by an adjudicating court in an objective fashion and
which can provide a principled and consistent basis for measuring government action
that in some way affects religion against the different elements of the principle of reli-
gious liberty. See infra text accompanying notes 126-137.
125. Defining the "reasonable person," or, to borrow Justice O'Connor's terminol-
ogy, the "objective observer," see infra text accompanying notes 154-157, raises severe
questions of its own. Perhaps no criteria for resolving problems concerning church-state
law could ever be truly objective; on the other hand, criminal and tort law within Anglo-
American jurisprudence presuppose just such a measurement for human behavior and
perception. As Professor Fletcher has written:
We lawyers should listen to the way we talk .... One of the most striking
particularities of our discourse is its pervasive reliance on the term "reasonable."
We routinely refer to reasonable time, reasonable delay, reasonable reliance, and
reasonable care .... Within these idioms pulse the sensibilities of the reasonable
person. For all the supposed concreteness of the common law, we can hardly func-
tion without this hypothetical figure at the center of legal debate.
Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L. REV. 949, 949 (1985).
Recall the debate between Justice Frankfurter and Professor Kurland in supra note 27,
and accompanying text. Reliance on a governing principle, such as Professor Kurland's
"strict neutrality," will help achieve clarity and predictability, but sacrifices adherence to
the underlying normative value. Consistent adherence to the normative value produces
the opposite result. The "reasonable person" methodology works only with the latter
approach. As Professor Fletcher notes:
[N]o set of rules can determine what is reasonable in all situations. Nor does rea-
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judicating court must take careful measure of all the relevant
facts, while keeping foremost in mind the underlying principle
to be effectuated.
A court should at least consider the following:
1) The form of the aid involved - is the religious institu-
tion receiving a specifically legislated grant, or is it merely ac-
cepting a benefit commensurate with its status as a part of the
general community? 2 Whenever government accords a special
benefit to religion, the conclusion that government is making a
statement as to the worth of a particular set of religious beliefs
becomes more reasonable to draw.12 7
sonableness lend itself to definitive specification on the basis of custom .... We
do not always know what the reasonable person requires, but working with this
open-ended concept at the core of our legal system saves us from the constricting
effects of positivism.
Id. at 930.
A criterion of reasonability, such as outlined below, can exist only if the underlying
principle of religious liberty is generally recognized and accepted. Otherwise, the factors
listed can provide no more guidance than any other governing principle, such as "separa-
tion." Justice O'Connor explicitly addressed this concern in her concurrence in Jaffree,
in her discussion of the apparent "tension" between the two clauses. See supra note 89.
In assessing the effect of [a statute that seeks to facilitate the free exercise of
religion by lifting a government imposed burden] - that is, in determining
whether the statute conveys the message of government endorsement of religion or
a particular religious belief - courts should assume that "the objective observer"
[is] acquainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus
individual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is exempted from a
particular government requirement, would be entitled to little weight if the Free
Exercise Clause strongly supported the exemption.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675-76 (1970):
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship .... No one has ever sug-
gested that tax exemption has converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into
arms of the state ....
Separation ... cannot mean absence of all contact; the complexities of mod-
em life inevitably produce [the same] incidental benefits accorded all persons or
institutions within a State's boundaries ....
Id. Accord Clark, supra note 60, at 461: "I think that the Court is concerned with the
extent to which the religious benefit is traditional, on the one hand, or whether, on the
other hand, granting the benefit changes the status quo apparently for the purpose of
benefiting religion." Id. (emphasis added). Cf. United Christian Scientists v. Christian
Science Bd. of Directors, No. 85-5959, slip op. at 20 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 1987) ("Where,
as here, government has bestowed a significant benefit upon a single religious denomina-
tion, we embark on this mission [of determining the legislative purpose] with special
care.").
127. See Gianella, supra note 119, at 517-18:
[G]overnmental preference of a particular religion, or even of religion in general
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2) Necessity - a form of coinvolvement permissible under
exigent circumstances might well devolve into a perception of
impermissible endorsement if it were to become part of the sta-
tus quo. The necessity that triggers the interaction between the
state and religion must be carefully weighed. State action re-
quired under particular circumstances should not imply an im-
primatur of approval or disapproval. 1 8
3) Identification with a particular set of religious be-
liefs - presence of this factor should require the adjudicating
court to place an onerous burden upon those seeking to defend
the church-state interaction. As with the form of aid involved,
the more specific the government behavior, the greater the
chance that a reasonable individual will perceive some form of a
message. 2 ' Conversely, when government treats "religion"'' 0 in
over irreligion, gives rise to an advantage which is clearly inconsistent with volun-
tarism and will surely breed political dissension.... [A]pplication of government
funds to religious purposes suffers from these twin evils because each citizen is
taxed to support the religion of others; but this proposition of fiscal noninvolve-
ment with religion is subject to exceptions .... Where the state does no more than
extend to religion the benefits of the prevailing social order, it does not lend the
kind of support forbidden by the principle of voluntarism.
Id.
128. The government expenses and aid necessary to accommodate the 1979 and
1987 visits of Pope John Paul II demonstrates that even an extensive church-state inter-
action will, under certain circumstances, raise little danger that a perception of state
approval will arise. See Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980)
(plaintiffs challenged expenditure of $200,000 by city on the erection of a special stage
and altar for the Papal Mass, but not the over $1,000,000 spent on security and crowd
control). Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (permanent vesting of
sovereign power in religious institution held unconstitutional).
129. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (state may not post the Ten Com-
mandments in public school classrooms). Accord Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246
(1982) ("[W]hen we are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference,
our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny
in adjudging its constitutionality."). See also Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir.
1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914,
2918 (1985); id. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965). The Court chose
to construe the words "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being," in the
congressional statute providing for conscientious objector exemptions from military ser-
vice, in the broadest sense those words could be interpreted in order to uphold the con-
stitutionality of the statute. The Court wrote that one could qualify for a "religious"
exemption if
a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives
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a broad, amorphous manner, the likelihood that a reasonable in-
dividual will conclude that such behavior is an endorsement of
or hostility towards any particular set of religious beliefs
diminishes." 1
4) Degree of coinvolvement - religious institutions and or-
ganizations perform a wide range of secular and sectarian func-
tions, and must necessarily interact and cooperate with institu-
tions of the state. But when the coinvolvement vests in the
institutions of religion certain powers that abide in the state, 13
or when government officials act in a religious capacity,13 1 or
when the state purports to use religious means, even to achieve
secular ends,13  a reasonable person will be more likely to draw a
particular conclusion as to the state's views towards a specific
religion.13
5) Context - the time, place, and manner of the coinvolve-
ment or type of aid must weigh heavily in the final analysis.1 36 A
religious icon or painting displayed in a public museum, for ex-
ample, will almost certainly send forth a far different message
than would the display of the same object in a government
building or on government property. State action which is per-
of their respective holders we cannot say that one is "in a relation to a Supreme
Being" and the other is not.
Id. at 166.
For the purposes of this paper, this interpretation is sufficiently broad. See supra
text accompanying notes 65-66. For a criticism of this definition, see Choper, supra note
66, at 594-97.
131. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1982), constitutes a permissible government treatment of religion. The statute prohibits
religious employment discrimination, and requires that employers "reasonably accommo-
date" the religious needs of their employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(j). The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission has specifically adopted the interpretation used by the
Court in Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, and has held this definition to be broad enough to encom-
pass even atheistic beliefs. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90
n.4 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. at
2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. See Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (control of
public school classrooms).
133. See Edwards v. Aguiliard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (state law requiring "creation-
science" to be taught in public schools equally with evolutionism).
134. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
135. See Larkin 459 U.S. at 125-26: "[T]he mere appearance of a joint exercise of
legislative authority by Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to reli-
gion in the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." Id. (emphasis added).
136. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. 668.
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missible when directed towards adults often becomes suspect
when directed towards impressionable children."' 7
In sum, courts will have to draw fine lines, but the task be-
comes possible once a clearly understood principle is articulated.
When deciding cases under the establishment clause, courts
must proscribe any government behavior that, through sponsor-
ship or approval of religion, through disapproval of or intrusion
within the proper sphere of religion, or through the creation of
sectarian factionalism, affects the free choice of individuals in
matters of religious belief. Making the leap of understanding
from the philosophically abstract notion of protecting free
choice in matters of religious belief, in order to maintain the au-
tonomy of the identity of each individual, to the facts of each
particular case does not provide quick answers, but it will per-
haps provide the right ones - "right" in the sense of permit-
ting a principled application of the constitutional language, al-
lowing a consistent harmony among different constitutional
provisions, and providing genuine substance and logical meaning
to the clauses themselves.
V. The Recent Cases and Justice O'Connor's Approach
The Supreme Court decided four establishment clause cases
during the 1984-1985 term.1 38 The tendency towards reliance
137. Compare Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (legislative chaplains held constitutional) with
Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (school prayer case).
138. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Aguilar
v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
The Court decided five religion clause cases during the 1985-1986 term. The Court
disposed of two cases, Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986)
and Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986)
without reaching the merits. Two other cases, Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services
for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1485 (1986) and Bowen v. Roy, 106
S. Ct. 2147 (1986), provided results that are consistent with the analysis suggested in this
Article. In Witters, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar a blind
person's decision to utilize state rehabilitation payments for religious training. The Court
considered the form of the benefit (payment to an individual for whatever type of educa-
tion he wished to seek), the necessity provoking the benefit (training for useful career in
spite of handicap), and the complete lack of identification with any particular form of
religious beliefs, or even with religion in general over nonreligion. The Court also noted
the lack of any coinvolvement between agents of the state and of the benefited religious
institution (at least on the record as it came before the Court, see 106 S. Ct. at 751 n.3),
and the particular context in which this aid was dispensed, received, and utilized by one
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upon governing principles ("neutrality," the Lemon test) runs
strong through each. There appears as well, however, a clear
trend towards the articulation of a normative underlying princi-
ple of religious liberty, and an application of the relevant gov-
erning principles in a manner intended to achieve that end. The
influence behind this trend stems largely from Justice O'Connor:
she alone offered a separate opinion in each of the four cases,
and the majority opinions in two of the cases openly acknowl-
edge the persuasiveness of her arguments.13 But both she and
the majority have left much unstated, and there remain crucial
problems in the Court's current analysis that must be addressed
if a coherent, workable normative principle of religious liberty is
ever to be settled. The Court will otherwise drift back to its dan-
gerous vacillation between the "absolutist" and the "revisionist"
individual. Justice O'Connor succinctly stated the necessary legal conclusion: "No rea-
sonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an inference that the state
itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief." Id. at 755 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Bowen, the Court held that the free exercise clause did not provide an individual
the right to direct the manner in which the government could utilize information in its
possession, and thus denied a father's request that his daughter be exempted from the
Department of Health and Human Services' requirement that her Social Security num-
ber be used for the purpose of processing claims for welfare benefits. His objection was
based on sincere religious reasons. A majority of the Court, however, see 106 S. Ct. at
2158-60 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2164-69 (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan and
Marshall, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2169 (White, J., dissent-
ing), would hold that the government could not deny an individual's request for welfare
benefits for refusing, on the basis of sincere religious convictions, to provide a Social
Security number upon request, absent a showing by the government of a compelling
interest and least restrictive means.
The Court erred badly, in this author's opinion, in disallowing the free exercise
claim presented in Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986). The majority in
Goldman simply chose to exercise a form of minimal scrutiny in weighing the petitioner's
claim that military dress regulations, insofar as they prevented him from wearing a yar-
mulke indoors while on duty, were unconstitutional as applied. "Our review of military
regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than consti-
tutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society." Id. at 1313. If
by this the Court meant only that a "compelling" interest, while accepted where asserted
by the military to justify an infringement of a constitutional right, might not be accepted
if proferred by a civilian agency, then the proposition would be unarguable. The Court,
however, made no effort to measure the Air Force's claimed interest in maintaining uni-
formity of dress in any way at all. As Justice O'Connor stated in her dissent, "[The free
exercise] test that one can glean from this Court's decisions in the civilian context is
sufficiently flexible to take into account the special importance of defending our Nation
without abandoning completely the freedoms that make it worth defending." Id. at 1325
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2490 n.42; Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3226.
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positions, with the attendant consequences.' 4
The majority opinion in Lynch focused primarily upon the
discreditation of one historical perspective, the "absolutist," and
its accompanying governing principle, "separation," in favor of
the "revisionist" historical perspective, and its own governing
principle of "accommodation.""' According to Lynch, a state
could permissibly accommodate religion, so long as 1) there ex-
isted no intent to exalt any particular set of religious beliefs, and
2) no hostility towards any set of religious beliefs was dis-
played." 2 The majority applied the Lemon test, 4 3 plausibly con-
cluding that the municipal government had a secular purpose
and that there existed no excessive entanglement in the inclu-
sion of a creche in its Christmas exhibition. The finding of a pri-
mary effect that "neither advances nor inhibits religion" was
somewhat disingenuous, however. The majority relied heavily
upon the results of Everson, McGowan, and Walz as instances of
permissible state support for religion"" and argued that the dis-
play of a creche could be analogized. Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion displayed a conceptually sounder approach by ac-
knowledging the need to reference the governing principles of
separation and neutrality in the Lemon test to some type of rec-
ognized underlying value. Her conclusion, however, cannot easily
be squared with the premises she set down for weighing the con-
stitutionality of the creche.
Justice O'Connor succinctly outlined two elements for an
underlying principle for the establishment clause. The first cor-
responds to the "Madisonian" element - the state should
avoid "foster[ing] the creation of political constituencies defined
along religious lines.' 4 5 The second element she identified es-
sentially combines the "Jeffersonian" and the "Williams" ele-
ments - the state must avoid "endorsement or disapproval" of
religious beliefs. "Endorsement sends a message to nonadher-
ents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
140. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
141. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672-78 (1984).
142. Id. at 673.
143. Id. at 679-85.
144. Id. at 680-82.
145. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message.' "1 4 Her analysis of the
facts in Lynch essentially concentrated on this second element.
Justice O'Connor concluded that the display of the creche
was not intended as and would not be perceived as government
endorsement of the beliefs symbolized. 14 7 Her syllogism appar-
ently ran thus: 1) Christmas is celebrated as a national holiday
and contains many secular aspects and traditions. 2) Public cele-
bration of the national holiday is not impermissible. 3) The
creche is a traditional symbol of the holiday. Therefore, "[t]he
display of the creche [serves] a secular purpose - celebration
of a public holiday with traditional symbols. It cannot fairly be
understood to convey a message of government endorsement of
religion." ' 818
Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Lynch contains a serious
flaw. Assuming arguendo that the celebration of Christmas as a
public holiday is permissible because, like the Sunday Closing
laws, government wants to provide a common "holiday season,"
the benefits of this season extend to all, regardless of religious
beliefs. The coincidence of this holiday season with a particular
religious holiday does not necessarily render the government
purpose invalid. The government must be very careful, however,
to avoid conveying the type of "endorsement" which might place
a burden upon the free choice of individuals in matters of reli-
gious belief. If, indeed, the designation of Christmas as a na-
tional holiday is permissible, it presumably is permissible that
the government may celebrate those aspects of the holiday that
permit its designation: the giving of gifts, the fostering of a spirit
of peace and goodwill, the spirit of renewal and hope. These as-
pects of the holiday are permissible matters of government be-
havior, since these are benefits which may extend equally to all
regardless of religious belief."49
However, the inclusion of a creche in a Christmas display
cannot be justified on the same grounds as Santa and elves and
reindeer. The creche conveys a message, a benefit, which does
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 693.
148 Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. But see DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL (1851).
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not extend equally to all, regardless of religious belief. As Justice
O'Connor correctly notes, "the religious and indeed sectarian
significance of the creche [is] not neutralized by the
setting . . . . ,,150 Thus, under the test she sets out, the display
of the creche clearly violates the underlying principles of the es-
tablishment clause which she has identified.
Justice O'Connor applied this same analysis to the "moment
of silence" that was at issue in Wallace v. Jaffree 1' and this
time followed her premises to reach a different conclusion. 152
The "endorsement or disapproval" test provides a sound basis
for distinguishing permissible church-state interaction from
those involvements that infringe the principle of religious lib-
erty, and the majority in Jaffree specifically incorporated it into
its application of the Lemon test.15 The majority would have
done better, however, had it adopted as well the method of ex-
amination utilized by Justice O'Connor in her separate opinion.
The soundness of Justice O'Connor's basic approach lies
both in the logical fit that exists between the underlying princi-
ple sought and the governing principles utilized to attain that
end, and the relative ease with which an adjudicating court may
apply those principles. She states her normative principle
clearly: "[T]he religious liberty protected by the Establishment
Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to re-
ligion relevant to a person's standing in the political commu-
nity.' 154 She articulates the behavior by government that vio-
lates this principle: "excessive entanglement with religious
institutions ... [that] foster[s] the creation of political constitu-
encies along religious lines' 5 and "endorsement or disap-
proval. 1 56 Finally, and most importantly, she creates a basic
framework for determining the existence of evils to be avoided.
In the context of the Alabama "moment of silence" law, she
150. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
152. Id. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
153. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2490.
154. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Justice O'Connor stated this formulation of the entanglement prong in Lynch,
465 U.S. at 637-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring), but emphasized her view that it should be
narrowly construed to prohibit only "institutional entanglement." See Felton, 105 S. Ct.
at 3247 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
156. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
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stated, "[t]he relevant issue is whether an objective observer, ac-
quainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation
of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer
in public schools." '157
The majority in Jaffree adopted the "endorsement or disap-
proval" test, but failed to embrace the other aspects of Justice
O'Connor's methodology. Justice Stevens' majority opinion ad-
dressed the individual freedom to believe or disbelieve which is
protected by the first amendment,'56 but failed both to draw a
satisfactory connection between government endorsement of re-
ligion and the abridgment of that right, and to state the proper
manner by which a lower court might determine the existence of
such endorsement (or disapproval). The Court in this instance
relied upon a close examination of the legislative history in order
to fix upon the "purpose" of the government behavior."8 9 Al-
though this was perhaps an appropriate method given the cir-
cumstances of this particular case, it would not be proper in
most others. The majority finally concluded that "[s]uch an en-
dorsement is not consistent with the established principle that
the Government must pursue a course of complete neutrality
toward religion,"' 60 but failed to establish the necessary nexus
between "complete neutrality" and the principle of religious
liberty.
The wisdom of Justice O'Connor's approach may be dis-
cerned as well in her concurring opinion in Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor, Inc.6 ' The Court, in Caldor, struck down a Connecti-
cut labor statute that granted Sabbath workers "an absolute and
unqualified right" to refrain from work on their Sabbath.' 62 In a
short, terse opinion, the majority invalidated the statute on the
ground that it imposed a rigid duty upon employers to conform
to their employees' religious predilections.'63
Implicit in the Court's reasoning was the inference that a
less rigid statute might well pass constitutional muster, but
157. Jafree, 105 S. Ct. at 2501 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 2488.
159. Id. at 2490-91.
160. Id. at 2492 (emphasis added).
161. 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985).
162. Id. at 2918.
163. Id. at 2917-18.
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nothing in the Court's analysis provided any clues as to why this
might be. If the defect in the Connecticut statute was that it
primarily advanced religion, why should a statute, such as Title
VII,11" that requires employers to accommodate, within reason,
the religious practices of their employees be any less infirm? The
difference lies in the perception of a reasonable person, or in
Justice O'Connor's phrase, "an objective observer. ' ' 16s According
to Justice O'Connor, this observer should realize two crucial dis-
tinctions between Connecticut's labor statute and Title VII. The
first, as noted, lies in the qualifying language of the federal stat-
ute that requires only "reasonable accommodation" from the
employer, who may be exempted if the accommodation would
cause "undue hardship."1 66 The second, more crucial distinction
lies in the reach of the two statutes. Connecticut's statute ap-
plied on its face only to adherents of Sabbatarian beliefs. 16 7 By
this limitation, the state identified itself with a particular set of
religious beliefs. A reasonable person could perceive from this
limitation some message from the state as to the "worth" or
"truth" contained in those beliefs. 6 8 Title VII, on the other
hand, seeks only to prevent discrimination on the basis of any
and all religious beliefs, along with discrimination based upon
race, color, and sex. 69 So long as the term "religion" is read
broadly enough,17 0 no reasonable person should understand the
statute to convey a message of endorsement. As Justice
O'Connor pointed out, religious beliefs are accorded no special
benefit, but are treated similarly to other suspect classifica-
164. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
165. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(j)(1).
167. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303e(b) (West 1985).
168.
The statute singles out Sabbath observers for special ... protection without ac-
cording similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of
other private employees. There can be little doubt that an objective observer or
the public at large would perceive this statutory scheme precisely as the Court
does today . . . . The message conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular
religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share it.
Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Cf.
United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, No. 85-5959 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1987) (discussed supra note 98).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
170. See supra notes 130-131.
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tions.171 Because an "objective observer" should understand the
distinction between a law that seeks to end employment dis-
crimination and a law that seeks to allow certain citizens to
practice their religion at the expense of other citizens, and if the
effect of these different perceptions on the objective observer is
clearly comprehended, 172 a basis for distinguishing between the
two statutes, stemming from the principle of religious liberty,
now exists.
The two cases involving public aid to private sectarian
schools, Grand Rapids School District v. Ball17 3 and Aguilar v.
Felton,174 decided together by the Court in the 1984-1985 term,
both demonstrate the Court's need to achieve greater analytical
clarity. The area raises too many sensitive issues, and directly
affects more individuals than do most of the Court's decisions
within establishment clause jurisprudence. The prior case law in
this area provides no clear guidance. 75 The majority opinions in
Ball and Felton both fell short of sufficiently structuring a direct
link between the facts of each particular case and the infringe-
ment of the normative underlying principle of religious liberty.
Even Justice O'Connor's "endorsement or disapproval" test re-
quires further expansion before it may be effectively applied to
the questions raised by this form of government interaction with
religion.
At issue in Ball were two programs directed by the School
District of the City of Grand Rapids. The Community Educa-
tion program entailed an arrangement whereby the school dis-
trict "leased" space from private sectarian schools. Classes in
secular subjects were taught after regular school hours by part-
time public school employees, who were in almost every instance
171.
Since Title VII calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and ex-
tends that requirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting
only the Sabbath observance, I believe an objective observer would perceive it as
an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion or a particular
religious practice.
Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
172. For a discussion of the principle of religious liberty, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 61-97.
173. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
174. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
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full-time employees of the institution from which the space was
leased.176 The Shared Time program also involved a lease ar-
rangement. Full-time employees of the public school entered the
parochial schools in order to offer supplementary courses in sec-
ular subjects during the regular school day, within the space that
had been leased by public schools. In Felton, the dispute arose
over a portion of title I of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965, designed to provide remedial educational ser-
vices to children of low-income families. The program included
children in parochial schools and thus had the same features as
the Grand Rapids Shared Time program - public school
teachers entered the parochial schools to provide assistance in
secular subjects.'77 The Court, in both cases, affirmed lower
court rulings that held these programs unconstitutional.'7 8
The majority in Ball strongly affirmed its reliance upon the
tripartite Lemon test 79 and then cited three different ways in
which the programs under scrutiny produced a primary effect
that advanced religion. The first concern of the Court was that
the teachers participating in the programs might either "inten-
tionally or inadvertently [inculcate] particular religious tenets or
beliefs."' 80 The Court also expressed concern that the interac-
tion between the government and the religious institution might
create a perception of "[a symbolic] union between church and
state."'18 Finally, the Court held that the type of aid provided
amounted to a direct subsidy of "the primary religious mission
of the institutions affected."' 82
The second of these stated effects, the "symbolic union," re-
states Justice O'Connor's "endorsement or disapproval" test.'83
The Court reasoned that the appearance of a joint enterprise be-
tween the church and the state would convey a message, particu-
larly to the children in the midst of this interaction, of govern-
176. Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3224.
177. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3236.
178. Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3231; Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3239.
179. Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3223.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 3226.
182. Id. at 3224.
183. Id. at 3226.
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ment endorsement of the religious beliefs involved.18 4 The Court
did not mention the "objective observer," however, nor state the
exact types of joint behavior that would give rise to this percep-
tion. The Court's argument would have been sounder had it not
stated its other two concerns as separate "effects" of the two
programs, but instead used those findings to bolster its conclu-
sion of a resulting symbolic union.
The Court's prior case law in this area is rife with seemingly
contradictory holdings.185 This stems from the Court's attempts
to equate qualitatively different types of aid as arguments on
behalf of permissibility or impermissibility in any one case."8 '
The "endorsement or disapproval" test adopted by the Court in
Ball, while providing a conceptually sounder link between the
harm to the individual and the normative principle to be upheld
than do the governing principles of separation or neutrality, will
nonetheless suffer from the same defects as the Court's previous
analyses unless the Court makes explicit exactly why certain
forms of government action may lead the objective observer to
perceive a message of government endorsement or disapproval.
The Court's first stated concern in Ball was that public
funds might be paid directly to teachers who were inculcating
religious dogma to children.1 87 Such action would amount to a
184. Id. See also Larken v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982).
185. A state may, for example, permissibly provide bus transportation for students
to and from sectarian schools, Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) but mpy not provide bus trans-
portation for class field trips, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). A state may pro-
vide such a school with textbooks on secular subjects, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968), but may not provide such learning devices as maps, globes and film projec-
tors, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). A state may provide diagnostic services
within a sectarian school building, Wolman, 433 U.S. 229, but the therapeutic services
required as a result of such diagnostic tests, e.g., hearing and speech therapy must take
place off-premises. Id. Accord Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2519 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. Cf. Schwarz, supra note 74, at 702-04:
The root defect of the balancing technique stated in . . . [Schempp] is its
failure clearly to identify and analyze the evil resulting from an aid to or ad-
vancement of religion.... In the absence of [such] analysis ... it is impossible to
balance intelligently a secular against a religious effect; consequently the standard
neither explains nor predicts the results it reaches.
... [This standard] inevitably equates qualitatively different aids to religion
and results in chaotically inconsistent applications.
Id. (emphasis added).
187. Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3224.
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direct government subsidy of religion. A reasonable person
would almost certainly conclude that such a direct subsidy was a
government endorsement of the religion receiving the aid and/or
a disapproval of those religions not so benefitting. But is the
concern itself one that reasonable persons might possess? Would
an "objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative his-
tory, and implementation of the statute,""18 share the Court's
fears concerning proselytism? The concern appears far more re-
alistic for the Community Education program than for the
Shared Time program.
The Community Education teachers were, overwhelmingly,
full-time teachers in the same parochial schools in which they
taught the Community Education classes, teaching the same stu-
dents whom they had taught during regular school hours. The
Shared Time teachers, however, were full-time public school em-
ployees who entered the parochial schools to teach secular sub-
jects. There exists little reason to believe that a nonsectarian
teacher will, by sole virtue of entering a parochial school, either
by design or by accident, impart any religious values to his/her
charges. The conveyance of a message of government endorse-
ment or disapproval to a reasonable person, due to this concern
over direct state subsidization of religion, appears reasonable for
the Community Education program, where the money goes di-
rectly to full-time parochial school teachers, but not for the
Shared Time program, where the money goes directly to public
school employees. The existence of a "symbolic union" arising
from the Shared Time program must rest upon other grounds.
The third concern articulated by the Ball majority lay in
the fear that public funds were subsidizing the religious mission
of the recipient sectarian institutions. 18' Again, the question
turns on whether an objective observer would view aid in the
form of public school teachers, teaching only secular subjects
that supplemented the core curriculum of the parochial schools,
as such a direct subsidization (and hence, as a message of en-
dorsement). The Ball majority confidently stated, "[t]his kind of
direct aid to the educational function of the religious school is
188. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2501 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See
supra text accompanying note 157.
189. Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3228.
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indistinguishable from the provision for a direct cash subsidy to
the religious school ... "190 In Felton, however, the Court found
no such effect arising from a federal program almost identical to
Grand Rapids' Shared Time program. Instead, the Felton Court
relied upon the "excessive entanglements" prong of the Lemon
test to invalidate the program."" The majority held that the
monitoring system devised by the City of New York to ensure
that no publicly paid employees advanced or denigrated any re-
ligious beliefs involved too excessive a degree of church-state
interaction.192
In both Ball and Felton, the majority reviewed the prece-
dents in the area of public aid to parochial schools and at-
tempted to derive a principled basis from those precedents for
invalidating the programs at issue. In Ball, the Court sought to
distinguish between impermissible forms of aid "that provide
'direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enter-
prise' ""9 and permissible forms of aid where "the government
has used primarily secular means to accomplish a primarily sec-
ular end . . ."19 The distinctions are not satisfactory; to state
them only begs the conclusion. The "indirect aid" of textbooks
loaned free of charge to nonpublic school students, for example,
held permissible in Board of Education v. Allen, ' 5 appears to
serve far more directly the primary educational function of the
beneficiary sectarian schools, than the "direct" aid of reimburse-
ment for repair expenses invalidated in Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist.'9 6 In practical application, the "direct-in-
direct" dichotomy has failed to bring either coherency or pre-
dictability to this area.1 97
190. Id. at 3229.
191. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3237.
192. Id.
193. Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3228 (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250).
194. Id. at 3228.
195. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
196. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
197. See Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final In-
stallment?, 1973 SUP. CT. REv. 57, 95-96: "If the underlying value secured by Establish-
ment Clause limitations on governmental involvement with religious enterprises is the
avoidance of religio-political strife, then it is clear that the ... direct-indirect approach
sacrifices substance to form." Id.
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VI. The Practical Application
Justice O'Connor's "endorsement or disapproval" test, ap-
plied through the "objective observer" analysis, may be able to
provide the proper basis for separating the forms of benefits that
infringe the underlying principle of religious liberty from those
that do not.
The following method should be utilized. If the Court
wishes to continue its adherence to the three-pronged test of
Lemon, it should, as it did in Ball, apply the test in accordance
with Justice O'Connor's analysis in Lynch: "The purpose prong
of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is
to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks
whether... the practice under view in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. ' 198 The Court must base its find-
ings of "endorsement or disapproval" on the perception of "an
objective observer," and the perception of the "objective ob-
server" should be derived from a close examination of the bene-
fit received by the sectarian institution. The examination should
approximate the one suggested earlier; 199 the Court should con-
sider the form of the challenged aid, the necessity that the bene-
fit seeks to address, whether the benefit closely identifies the
government with any particular set of religious beliefs, the de-
gree of coinvolvement between religious and government institu-
tions that the benefit requires, and the particular context in
which the church-state interaction actually occurs. These factors
should be weighed and balanced with a mind towards avoiding
the perception that public funds are being used to help paro-
chial schools in their core function of sectarian education. Such
a perception will infringe upon one of the three elements of the
principle of religious liberty that underlie the establishment
clause.2 00 This results in the evil of state behavior affecting the
relationship between the individual objective observer and the
general community on the basis of religion, which implicates the
free choice of the individual in matters of religious belief.
The analysis now shifts towards determining the "core func-
tion of sectarian education." Consider three forms of public ben-
198. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 126-137.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 61-97.
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efits already held permissible by the Court: bus transporta-
tion,20 1 diagnostic services, 202 and secular textbooks.203 In each
case, the aid took the form of a specific service or item, rather
than a cash subsidy; this would argue for permissibility.2 " The
necessity that the benefits sought to address, however, are quite
different. Bus transportation and diagnostic services respond to
concerns over the safety and welfare of children. The secular
textbooks directly respond to the educational needs of the child
within the classroom itself. The teaching of secular subjects
clearly stands as one of the core functions of a sectarian
education.
There appears no basis for discerning an identification with
any particular set of religious beliefs from any of these types of
benefits, assuming of course that they were disbursed in an
evenhanded fashion.2 0 5 Nor did any of these benefits require any
excessive degree of coinvolvement between religious and govern-
mental institutions. Examining the particular context, however,
again shows a crucial distinction. The important question for the
objective observer is: could this particular aid be utilized by a
sectarian school in its advancement of religious dogma? The
context in which the benefit is given and received will often
prove dispositive. In these examples, there appears little chance,
based on the above criteria, that an objective observer would
view a bus or a diagnostic test as likely to inculcate any religious
doctrine to the recipient children. A secular textbook, however,
is used in the classroom itself. As stated above, secular educa-
tion is as much a core function of the parochial school as secta-
rian education.
The sectarian and the secular aspects of religious education
are not entirely severable." 6 It is not unreasonable to believe
201. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
202. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
203. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
204. Cf. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3228 (1985): "With but
one exception, our cases have struck down attempts by States to make payments out of
public tax dollars directly to primary or secondary religious educational institutions." Id.
(citations omitted).
205. This can be a highly problematic assumption. See Lupu, supra note 65, at 752:
"Aid to religious schools [has] tended to favor those religious traditions with national,
hierarchical structures." Id.
206. Cf. Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3227: "[Tjhe parochial school's total operation serves to
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that in the context of a parochial school classroom, a secular
textbook will be used to advance more than secular knowl-
edge.20" When the context in which the government benefit is
received and utilized by the parochial school creates a percep-
tion that the state and the church are joined as partners in the
educational process, even if only in the secular aspect of the pa-
rochial school education, the Court should proscribe the govern-
ment behavior that creates this perception, insofar as it conveys
a message of government endorsement of religious beliefs. 0
Given the above analysis, the Court appears to have been correct
in upholding bus transportation and diagnostic services, and in-
correct when it failed to disallow the loan of secular textbooks.
This argument for impermissibility applies with far greater
force to the Shared Time program in Ball. There exists a far
greater degree of coinvolvement between the church and the
state in the loan of teachers than in the loan of textbooks. In
Ball, the religious institutions and the municipal government
worked together to advance one of the core functions of secta-
fulfill both secular and religious functions concurrently, and the two cannot be com-
pletely separated. Support of any part of its activity entails some support of the disqual-
ifying religious function of molding the religious personality of the young student." Id.
(quoting Gianella, supra note 119, at 574) (emphasis added).
207. Cf. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1682-83
(1969):
[Everson stated that] a general safety measure could be applied for the benefit of
the community - indeed might have to be so applied - irrespective of the reli-
gious or non-religious character of the beneficiaries .... The same principle would,
in my view, support free medical examinations or hot lunches for all schoolchil-
dren, wherever they might be found ....
Now buses and nurses and lunches are not ideological; they are atmospheri-
cally indifferent on the score of religion. Can the same be said of textbooks chosen
by a parochial school for compulsory use, interpreted with the authority of teach-
ers selected by that school, and employed in an atmosphere deliberately designed
through sacred symbol to maintain a religiously reverent attitude?
Id.
208. See Kirby, supra note 59, at 571:
It may be conceded that the primary purposes of legislative supporters of
lower school aid are to help preserve parochial schools as providers of secular edu-
cation. To accept such schools as satisfying the public purpose ... but to forbid
public funds from following that public purpose is troubling .... [E]xtension of
this reasoning, [however], would make the church and the government. working
partners in the total education function of the Church.... Without returning to
the "no-aid" absolutism .... one can consistently say that the first amendment
means at least "no partnership."
Id. (emphasis added).
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rian education. The Court's decision to invalidate the program
was correct, but the majority opinion failed to elucidate the
proper basis upon which to rest the holding.
The Court should also apply the "excessive entanglements"
prong of the Lemon test in accordance with the "objective ob-
server" test. The Court in Felton relied upon this prong in strik-
ing down the title I program.2 °0 As stated earlier, this program
was closely monitored by the City of New York. Assuming that
such steps on the part of the government would prevent the ob-
jective observer from perceiving any message of endorsement,
there remains the problem of the monitoring itself. To what ex-
tent may the state be permitted to interfere in the functioning
of the parochial school?210
Justice O'Connor, in her Felton dissent, suggests that "ex-
cessive entanglements" should no longer serve as a separate
prong, but should only be applied as part of the "endorsement
or disapproval" test.21 That should not change the result, how-
ever, if the analysis suggested above is utilized.2 2 Examining the
title I program absent the monitoring system, one finds the same
constitutional defects as contained in the Shared Time program
in Ball.21 s Assume, however, that the City's monitoring system
sufficiently alters the context in which the objective observer
views the program. This might protect against a perception of
endorsement. Unfortunately, the increased degree of coinvolve-
ment between the institutions of the state and the parochial
school now gives rise to another evil. The state, if it is not ad-
vancing a core function of the sectarian education, is instead
now intruding impermissibly into this same core function. 214 It is
209. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3237 (1985).
210. Cf. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("[I emphasize] the pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt reli-
gious schools to compromise their religious mission without wholly abandoning it. The
disease of entanglement may infect a law discouraging wholesome religious activity as
well as a law encouraging the propagation of a given faith.").
211. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3247 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 198-208.
213. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3236.
214.
The principle that the state should not become too closely entangled with the
church in the administration of assistance is rooted in two concerns. When the
state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious signifi-
cance, the freedom of religious belief of those who are not adherents of that de-
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of course true that this results in a "Catch-22, '21 but it is not
one of the Court's creation.
The conclusion in the area of government aid to parochial
schools is clear. There can be no benefits accruing to these
schools that directly advance the core function of the sectarian
enterprise. More succinctly, government must stay out of the pa-
rochial school classroom.21 Other forms of aid, that an objective
observer would not consider an advancement of the core func-
tion,1 7 may well be permissible." 8
nomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose underlying the involve-
ment is largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even the adherents of the
denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters.
Id. at 3237.
215. Id. at 3243 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
216. This analysis cuts both ways. Cf. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Chris-
tian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986). This author does not believe that the establish-
ment clause could permit the type of intrusion into the sectarian school classroom con-
templated by the state in this case. Just as the state may not send its own personnel in
to promote a "core function" of the sectarian institution, neither may it dictate to the
school the individuals who shall perform those functions. Cf. also Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987) (discussed supra note 89).
217. Attempting to define with particularity that which constitutes a "core func-
tion" of a sectarian school, or of a religious organization in general, presents no fewer
problems than an attempt to define "religion" itself. See supra note 66. Such a discus-
sion is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Lupu, supra note 205, at 400-16
(criticizing such efforts). Cf. Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2870 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at
2873 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Justices Brennan and O'Connor each acknowledging the
hazards of seeking to determine the areas within a religious organization into which the
government may not intrude).
218. A state statute that permitted the distribution of state heating oil to all
schools, including sectarian and nonsectarian private schools, would probably be found
permissible under the above analysis. So might a statute that permitted state workers
and state materials to be used in making repairs to sectarian and nonsectarian private
schools, especially where failure to do so might pose a health hazard for the attending
children. See Freund, supra note 208. This same analysis also suggests why the Felton
program, if offered to parochial school students in the public schools, would probably
survive constitutional scrutiny. Cf. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244-48 (therapeutical psycholog-
ical services in public and nonpublic schools).
Consider also the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act of 1984, 20 U.S.C. §§
4071-4074 (Supp. III 1985). The Act, in essence, seeks to guarantee that no extracurricu-
lar public high school student group shall be denied an opportunity to meet on school
premises during "noninstructional time .... on the basis of the religious, philosophical,
or other content of the speech at such meetings." Id. at § 4071(a), (b). The Act effec-
tively extends the application of the Court's ruling in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981), to include public high school students. The Court itself declined to address the
propriety of such an extension in Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct.
1326 (1986).
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VII. Conclusion
The free choice of each individual in our society in matters
of religious belief must remain inviolate. Religion must be com-
pletely irrelevant to the manner in which the government causes
the individual to interact with the general community. The sub-
stantive principle of religious liberty that underlies the religion
clauses of the first amendment provides this guarantee. The es-
tablishment clause elements of this principle are infringed by
government behavior that, through sponsorship or endorsement
of religion, through disapproval of or intrusion into the proper
sphere of religion, or through the creation of sectarian factional-
ism, affects the free choice of individuals in matters of religious
belief. Continued adoption and further expansion by the Court
of Justice O'Connor's "endorsement or disapproval" test, as per-
ceived by "an objective observer," will permit the Court to iden-
tify and separate permissible forms of church-state interaction
The constitutional difficulties cannot be easily resolved by resort to free speech prin-
ciples, as the dissenters in Bender argued. While it is certainly true, as Chief Justice
Burger noted, "that nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the State to suppress a
person's speech merely because the content of the speech is religious in character," id. at
4311 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), it remains equally true, as pointed
out earlier, see supra note 96, that establishment and free speech concerns will at times
cut in opposite directions, and there is no justification for a rule that would mandate the
automatic trumping of the establishment concerns in such cases. Cf. Widmar, 454 U.S. at
271 ("equal access" policy not incompatible with establishment clause).
The question of constitutionality is a close one. A reasonable person, or "an objec-
tive observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
statute," Wallace v. Jafree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2501 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring),
would, given the context of religious activity occuring in public high schools, probably
perceive the type of danger that the Jeffersonian element of religious liberty seeks to
avoid. By the same token, however, the failure to extend to student religious meetings an
existing benefit that is extended to all other student groups could easily be perceived as
the type of negative imprimatur that the Williams element attempts to proscribe.
Ultimately, the Act is saved by what appear to be sufficient prophylactic safeguards
which will prevent any degree of coinvolvement between the private, individual students
and public school officials, see Lupu, supra note 205, at 759-61, and most importantly, by
the scope of the Act itself, which, like Title VII, see supra note 131, extends far past
religion and religious speech. The expansiveness of the Act will prevent an objective ob-
server from perceiving the type of close identification between government and any par-
ticular religious beliefs (or with religious beliefs in general) that can in turn lead to the
type of sectarian factionalism that the Madisonian element seeks to prevent. If it were
not for the facial expansiveness of the Act, which classifies religious expression as a pro-
tected form of speech, rather than affording a special protection to religion not man-
dated by the free exercise clause, the above analysis would have to lead to a conclusion
of unconstitutionality.
1988]
53
302 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:249
from those that abrogate the principle of religious liberty. The
Court must avoid doctrinaire extremes and reliance upon gov-
erning principles, such as "separation," absent a clear under-
standing of the ends that the governing principles are intended
to effect. The principle of religious liberty requires the drawing
of a fine line, not the building of a brick wall, or no wall at all.
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